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RATIONALIZING INJUSTICE:
THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PROPERTY TAX
John A. Miller*
[T]he conduct of government is the testing ground of social ethics
and civilized living.'
Don't tax you, don't tax me,
Tax that fellow behind the tree.2
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When the United States Supreme Court addresses a challenge to
a state taxing scheme under the Equal Protection Clause, it is obliged
to uphold the taxing scheme as long as the classifications employed
within it have a rational basis. In deciding whether the classifications
employed by the state are rational, what is the Court's obligation, if
any, to take account of principles of tax theory? I won't leave you in
suspense. The answer, apparently, is none. This answer is neither
gratifying nor startling. A purpose of this Article is to offer an expla-
nation to courts and to constitutional scholars why they should con-
sider the normative standards of tax theory in reaching decisions
about the constitutionality of taxation schemes. It also has a more
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particular purpose-to offer a critical examination of the Supreme
Court's recent decision concerning the California property tax scheme
popularly known as Proposition 13. In the case referred to,
Nordlinger v. Hahn,3 constitutional rationality as found by the Court
and tax rationality are widely divergent. Though I recognize that
constitutional rationality and tax rationality are often concerned with
different things,4 I also believe that tax rationality should inform
constitutional rationality. In appropriate cases, I will argue, tax ratio-
nality should even determine constitutional rationality. I believe that
Nordlinger v. Hahn was such a case.
The provision of Proposition 13 in question in Nordlinger estab-
lished that real property owners are taxed based on their acquisition
costs (as opposed to the traditional base of fair market value).5
Stephanie Nordlinger challenged that provision on the ground that it
denied her the right to equal protection of the laws granted to her by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The
essential factual basis for her claim was that under Proposition 13 she
was obliged to pay approximately five times as much in property
taxes as similarly housed neighbors simply because she had acquired
her home at a later date than her neighbors. By an eight to one vote,
the Court concluded that the acquisition-cost assessment scheme of
Proposition 13 has a rational basis and, thus, did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. It is argued here that the Court's decision is
wrong. Indeed, it is my conviction that though Nordlinger v. Hahn
may reflect much of today's conventional constitutional wisdom, it is
an extraordinarily bad decision.
My thesis-that on occasion tax rationality should determine
constitutional rationality-rests upon the recognition that just forms of
taxation are a fundamental element of a just society. It also arises
from a recognition that taxing schemes have central organizing princi-
3. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992). Three recent publications addressing
Nordlinger are Andrew S. Johnston, Case Comment, Tax Law-Nordlinger v. Hahn: Constitu-
tionality of "Welcome Stranger" Laws Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 891 (1993); Samuel A. Mandarino, Note, Nordlinger to
Allegheny: "This Town Ain't Big Enough for the Both of Us", 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1195; and
Michael D. Rawlins, Note, Taxation, Equal Protection, and Inquiry into the Purpose of a
Law: Nordlinger v. Hahn and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission, 1993
B.Y.U. L. REv. 1001.
4. The central difference, perhaps, is that constitutional rationality analysis must concern
itself with the harm the Court may do by upsetting the democratic processes by which laws
are enacted. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST 5-9 (1980).
5. CAL. CONST. art. XIIA, § 2 (West Supp. 1993).
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pies. The elimination of one or more of these *principles from a tax-
ing scheme may render it so misshapen in form and so distorted in
substance that allowing the tax to stand is unconscionable. The argu-
ment, then, is that the Supreme Court should follow tax rationality at
least in those cases where tax theory tells us that a legislative classifi-
cation scheme has violated the most fundamental principles of fair
taxation.
I wish to be clear that I am not arguing that some theoretical
flaw at the periphery of a tax should render it constitutionally infirm.
It is beyond challenge that our taxing schemes, both state and federal,
contain many vices when viewed from the tax theorist's perspective.
Some of these perceived failings have enormous consequences."
Moreover, there is little unanimity on many aspects of tax theory.7
But there are a few principles on which there is general agreement.
Horizontal equity-the principle of treating like cases alike-in partic-
ular is widely regarded as a fundamental tax principle. The absolute
elimination of horizontal equity prevents a tax-any tax-from being
fair. I will argue that Proposition 13's disregard for horizontal equity'
is so pervasive and so deep that it should not be considered to have
a rational basis.
Part II of this Article provides historical and descriptive back-
grounds concerning the property tax, Proposition 13, and the Equal
Protection Clause as it has been applied to state taxing schemes and
conduct. This part includes a brief argument for more exacting judi-
cial scrutiny than is typical in rational basis cases. Part I develops
the facts presented by the case of Nordlinger v. Hahn and discusses
6. For example, the home mortgage interest deduction provided in the federal income
tax is often criticized as a housing subsidy for the middle and upper classes. See, e.g., Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Econom-
ic Committee, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 49-51 (1972); see also Allen D. Manvel, Upside Down
Housing 'Aid'?, 53 TAX NOTES 743 (1991); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform
for Fairness and Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
459, 485-88 (1993).
7. For example, there is a longstanding and ongoing debate among tax theorists con-
cerning the relative merits of income taxation versus consumption taxation. See, e.g., Joseph
Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption
Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377 (1992); Michael J. Graetz,
Revisiting the Income Tax vs. Consumption Tax Debate, 58 TAX NOTES 1437 (1992); Edward
J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145
(1992) (arguing for a middle path between those two forms of taxation). The literature on
this question is legion. For further references see McCaffery, supra, at 1146 nn.2-3. For other
topics of controversy in tax theory see STEPHEN G. UTz, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION
AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES (1993).
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the three opinions filed by members of the Court; the majority opin-
ion by Justice Blackmun, the concurring opinion by Justice Thomas,
and the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. The main emphasis of
this part is a critique of the rationalizations the majority offered for
upholding Proposition 13. From these premises and with this back-
ground, part IV will critique the assessment scheme adopted in Propo-
sition 13 from a tax theory perspective. It describes how Proposition
13 eliminates the central organizing principle of traditional property
taxation. It shows that the elimination of this organizing principle
takes away the chief equitable justification for the property tax. In a
society that values fairness, it is argued, a taxing scheme that is based
on unfairness is irrational. Part V will proceed to illustrate the irratio-
nality of Proposition 13's assessment scheme by translating that
scheme into comparable schemes of income taxation and consumption
taxation. When viewed against the backdrop of more widely under-
stood taxation systems, Proposition 13's startling irrationality will
stand clear of the rubble produced by political warfare and constitu-
tional theorizing. Part VI then addresses the connection between con-
stitutional rationality and tax theory.
II. THREE ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION ADDRESSED
A. The Property Tax in Theory and in Practice
Though in some respects this Article may be seen as a defense
of the traditional property tax, a fair presentation of the central issue
obliges me to begin by painting a rather unflattering portrait of the
tax I seek to defend.
The property tax is a tax of peculiar complexity, and it poses
administrative and theoretical problems that differ from those of other
taxes.8 Though it is not as complex as an income tax, its limitations
8. The property tax came into being in medieval Europe as a tax on land and the
chattels used in agriculture. EDwiN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 11 (9th ed. 1921).
In its earliest phase, value was placed on the property by reference to the land's productivity.
Id. at 12. Later, valuation was measured by selling value. Id. In this country, the property
tax rose to prominence in state and local taxation during the nineteenth century. JEROME R.
HELLERSTEIN. I STATE TAXATION § 1.2 (1983). Its importance at the state level has since
declined, but it has continued as a chief provider of local tax revenues, especially for
schools, throughout our history. Id. § 1.3; see also JEROME HELLERSTEIN & WALTER
HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 8 (5th ed. 1988) [hereinafter STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION]; DICK NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 1 (1966). Though widely
vilified for decades, it persists and, indeed, as far as real property taxation is concerned,
1993]
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are even more stubbornly intransigent than those of the income tax.
However, in outline it is simple to understand. Like most taxes, a
property tax liability is arrived at by applying a rate to a base. The
property tax rate is often stated as certain number of mills9 or cents
per hundred dollars of value. Traditionally, the base against which the
rate is levied is the fair market value of the property subject to the
tax.' ° Thus, for example, if there is a tax on real property imposed
at the rate of twenty-five cents per one hundred dollars of value, then
a home worth one hundred thousand dollars would generate a proper-
ty tax liability of two hundred fifty dollars."
It is useful to note at this early stage that since the tax rate is
simply a mathematical multiplier with an inherently arbitrary as-
pect,'2 it is the tax base that serves as the tax's chief equitable com-
ponent. For example, if our property tax rate was two hundred fifty
dollars per item of property and our tax base was defined as brick
houses with wooden shutters, our first question in considering the
fairness of the tax would likely be whether the base was equitable.
We would almost certainly ask such questions as why are brick
homes without shutters favored over brick homes with shutters, and
shows no signs of fading away. NETZER, supra, at 1. The most prominent and outspoken of
the early critics of the property tax was E.R.A. Seligman. As will be discussed, Seligman, in
his influential treatise Essays in Taxation, railed against the property tax on both practical
and theoretical grounds.
With the development of a mercantile economy and, later still, of an industrial econo-
my, the property tax was largely supplanted by excise taxes. These taxes, levied upon the
transfer of property or services, are what today we call consumption taxes. The twentieth
century saw the rise of the income tax, first at the federal level and then at the state level.
Nonetheless, in this country the property tax retains unusual prominence. Indeed this country
is anomalous in its taxing scheme since both the property tax and the income tax are signifi-
cantly more important here than they are in much of the rest of the world. See, e.g., Charles
E. McLure, Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for Income Taxes as the
International Norm, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 145 (1992); John A. Miller, State Adoption of a Value
Added Tax: A Desperate Act in Search of the Proper Occasion, 71 NEB. L. REv. 192, 207
n.59, (1992) (describing the growing importance of the value added tax throughout the world);
Peggy B. Musgrave, "Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for Income Taxes as
the International Norm": A Comment, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 179 (1992).
9. A mill is one tenth of one cent. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 993 (6th ed.
1990).
10. Fair market value refers to the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller if
both were well-informed and neither were acting under a compulsion. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-1(b) (1958).
11. $100,000 / $100 = $1,000; S1,000 x $0.25 = $250.
12. The rate, of course, is not simply drawn from the air. Its selection will depend on
political circumstances, revenue needs, ability to pay and other factors. But, it is arbitrary in
the sense that it is inflexible and certain.
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so on. Especially when we are dealing with a proportionate or flat
rate tax such as the property tax, our eyes are irresistibly drawn to
the base when we consider the fairness of the tax.
The property tax suffers from several theoretical difficulties.
Moreover, a persistent problem with the property tax is that its ad-
ministration does not always comport with its already flawed theory.
For instance, a common phenomena in property tax assessment is the
failure of assessments to keep pace with the appreciation of real
property. 3 Over time assessors often fall into the practice of assess-
ing property in a roughly uniform but fractional manner. Thus, real
property may be assessed at forty percent, sixty percent, or eighty
percent of its market value. 4 This failing, while significant, does not
pose on its face major equity concerns because use of fractional as-
sessments is not overtly aimed at shifting the property tax burden
from one group to another. 5 Instead fractional assessment largely
serves as a way of capping (in a proportionate manner) everyone's
tax bills in an inflationary economy. Though the fractional assessment
approach is illegal in those states where the law mandates assessment
at fair market value, and though the practice has often received judi-
cial condemnation," it persists in many jurisdictions. 7
There are other practical problems with the traditional property
tax. First and foremost is the difficulty inherent in valuing property
that has not recently been the subject of an arm's length sale. 8 As-
sessors have developed various techniques for valuing such property,
but still the question of value is often problematic. 9 Another prob-
13. See STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra note 8, at 128-46.
14. Some states, such as California prior to Proposition 13, provide by law for fraction-
al assessments. See George Lefcoe & Barney Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13:
The Amador Valley Case, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 173, 198 (1979).
15. However, it has been argued that fractional assessments do in fact shift tax burdens
because the tax system becomes secretive. This secretiveness, it is argued, can disguise errors
arising from "political favoritism, incompetence, corruption, or other factors." DIANE B. PAUL,
THE POLITICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 4-5 (1975).
16. See, e.g., Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
17. See, e.g., PAUL. supra note 15. at 4-7. In many jurisdictions the tax assessor is an
elected official. In a rising market, the tax assessor who maintains assessments at fair market
value is causing her constituents to owe more taxes with each reassessment. Naturally, such
an assessor may have trouble getting reelected. There are a number of other explanations that
have been offered as to why assessors frequently underassess property. See id. at 27-30.
18. See generally Jennifer J.S. Brooks & Ronald J. Schultz, Market Theory: An Ap-
proach to Real Property Valuation for State and Local Tax Purposes, 45 TAX LAW. 339
(1992).
19. I have elsewhere suggested that the problem of valuation is epistemological in ori-
gin. See John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplifica-
1993]
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lem, as was pointed out by Professor E.R.A. Seligman more than
sixty years ago, is the difficulty of taxing some forms of property
such as intangible property and other movable property because such
property is hard to locate and is easily concealed. 0 But if personal
property is excluded from the tax base, the tax may distort economic
behavior and fall inequitably upon landowners."
A further problem with the property tax, one which is central to
its disfavor with taxpayers,' is its failure to necessarily coincide
with the taxpayer's ability to pay in a liquidity sense.' One may be
land-rich and cash-poor. But the property tax must be paid annually
or semi-annually in cash. Thus, the land-rich, cash-poor taxpayer is
certain to feel some pain in satisfying her property tax obligation.
Naturally, this pain will intensify in an economy where land values
are rising rapidly because, without other adjustments,24 assessment
tion in the Law of Taxation. 68 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 57 (1993).
20. See SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 19-61. A lengthy quotation from Seligman on the
matter discussed in the text is found in STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra note 8, at 116
(quoting the 10th edition).
21. Simply put, if the tax falls on real property but not on intangible property such as
stocks and bonds, the tax provides an incentive to invest in intangibles rather than in land.
Most tax theorists would agree that an ideal tax should be economically neutral so that the
market for goods and services will operate most efficiently. For a discussion of neutrality
principles, see McCaffery, supra note 7, at 1157.
22. "The property tax is certainly the most unpopular of all major taxes." PAUL, supra
note 15, at 1. The dislike of the property tax is not limited to the average citizen. The prop-
erty tax has been nearly universally criticized by scholars since the nineteenth century. See
NETZER, supra note 8, at 3-8.
23. See SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 56-61; George F. Break, Adam Smith and the Prop-
erty Tax: Some Neglected Advice, at 2-3 (Lincoln Inst. Tax Pol'y, Tax Pol'y Roundtable,
Prop. Tax Papers Series No. TPR-3, 1979). Professor Seligman was an advocate of taxation
based on "the ability principle" and thus advocated retreat from property taxation in favor of
income taxation and gratuitous transfer taxation. See Clarence Heer, The Property Tax as a
Measure of Ability, in PROPERTY TAXEs 155 (Tax Pol'y League ed., 1940). Just what is
meant by ability to pay is not entirely clear. But certainly at its simplest level, ability to pay
refers to liquidity. But it may also be taken to encompass principles of progressive income
taxation and exemption for the poor. Id. at 159. The property tax has been described as a
regressive tax. This is because it falls heavily on housing, and lower income people spend a
greater portion of their total income on housing than higher income people. Id. at 162. But
the economic incidence of the property tax is the subject of some controversy, especially with
respect to the question of whether the property tax is shifted from landlords to renters. See
PAUL, supra note 15, at 13-15. At least we can say in the case of owner occupied dwellings,
that a traditional market value assessment property tax is proportionate to one's wealth as
measured by the property subject to assessment (assuming no mortgage).
Another defect in the property tax is that it is difficult to collect in a timely fashion.
See NETZER, supra note 8, at 6.
24. However, adjustments are quite possible. This point is discussed at several places
later on in this Article. I mention it here because the ability to make adjustments to control
[Vol. 22:79
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increases will augment tax bills just as effectively as rate increases.
Over time persons of modest cash income may find themselves pay-
ing high property taxes simply because of their good fortune or their
wisdom in the selection of a place to live.
The failure of the property tax to necessarily coincide with abili-
ty to pay is a clear structural weakness of the tax, and this weakness
may well cause one to wonder why the property tax survives.' Cer-
tainly the public has voiced widespread dissatisfaction with the prop-
erty tax for decades. 6 There is some authority, however, indicating
that at least with respect to residential property there is a rough corre-
lation between the value of one's property and one's ability to pay."
In other words, though the property tax does not necessarily correlate
with ability to pay on a theoretical plane, it may well do so as a
practical matter. Thus, the ability-to-pay objection to the property tax
may not be as significant a failing of the tax as it at first appears. 8
the impact of inflation on homeowners living on modest fixed incomes was a crucial, though
flawed, justification for Proposition 13's enactment.
25. This question was already being asked more than fifty years ago. See Leo D.
Woodworth, Importance of Property Tax in State and Local Tax Systems, in PROPERTY TAX-
Es 3, 7 (Tax Pol'y League ed., 1940) ("Why has it been continued while it became less and
less a measure of ability to pay for the costs of government?"). Yet the fact remains that the
property tax has been a relatively stable source of revenue in our society for hundreds of
years. See PAUL, supra note 15, at 1.
26. See NEzER, supra note 8, at 1. Indeed, property tax rate limitation statutes and
constitutional amendments were quite common in the 1930s. See Lawrence G. Holmes, Over-
All Tax Limitation, in PROPERTY TAXES, 35, 37-43 (Tax Pol'y League ed., 1940) (nine states
adopted rate limitation provisions).
27. See NETZER, supra note 8, at 29-30; see also George G. Kaufman, Inflation, Propo-
sition 13 Fever, and Suggested Relief, in THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT 215, 219 (George T.
Kaufman & Kenneth T. Rosen eds., 1981) ("Contrary to public belief, recent evidence sug-
gests that it is, at minimum, proportional if not progressive.").
28. Netzer notes, however, that viewed as an excise tax on consumption, i.e., as a tax
on housing, the property tax "is higher in rate than any other generally used American con-
sumption tax." NE'ITZER, supra note 8, at 30 (writing in 1966).
Still another objection to the property tax is its treatment of debt. See SELIGMAN,
supra note 8, at 29-30. Even though the property tax's traditional claim to being a just tax
is based on its function as a tax on wealth, typically no allowance is made for mortgages on
the assessed property. This is not to say that a tax can be viewed as just without considering
the use to which the revenues are put. "In a democracy . . . the ultimate justification of all
taxation is the general social welfare." Heer, supra note 23, at 157. But especially when the
mortgage arises out of the acquisition of the property, it is clear that the property owner is
taxed in part on the illusion of wealth rather than on wealth itself. For example, one who
buys a home for one hundred and fifty thousand dollars by borrowing one hundred thousand
dollars and by spending fifty thousand dollars of her own money is readily understood to
have only fifty thousand dollars of equity in the home at the time of purchase. If we wish
to tax the homeowner on her wealth, that is, on her net worth, our tax base should be fifty
thousand rather than one hundred fifty thousand dollars. The fundamental equation of account-
1993]
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If the question addressed in this Article was whether we should
abandon the property tax, I could not vouch for the final answer. But
ing is:
ASSETS = LIABILITIES + NET WORTH.
When we wish to solve for net worth, we simply shift the elements of the equation like so:
NET WORTH = ASSETS - LIABILITIES.
This is the foundation of double-entry bookkeeping first described in writing in 1494 by Luca
Pacioli, an Italian mathematician. See STANLEY SIEGEL & DAVID A. SIEGEL, ACCOUNTING
AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 14 (1983).
The way to arrive at what seems a fairer tax base would be to allow the property
owner to deduct the mortgage amount from the assessed value of the home. But the apparent
simplicity of this solution is illusory. This is because the problem of coverage and the prob-
lem of debt are interconnected, and can only be solved through a solution that is also inter-
connected. If we seek to solve the taxation of debt problem by allowing a deduction from
fair market value for mortgages, we create an incentive to create false debts or to borrow
against property when there is no independent economic motive for doing so. Thus, if the
coverage of the tax extends only to real property, a debt deduction would create an incentive
for taxpayers to borrow against their real property in order to invest in some form of tax-free
property. The most theoretically sound solution would be to tax all forms of property at the
same rate based on fair market value assessments (including the taxation of debt instruments
in the hands of the lenders), and to allow a deduction for secured debts against the value of
the property that secures them. In this way each taxpayer would, be taxed on her net worth.
The property tax would be a true wealth tax. This common sense view of property taxation
is subject to challenge. Arguments can be made that different forms of wealth should be
taxed at different rates. See, e.g., Simeon E. Leland, Some Observations Concerning the Clas-
sified Property Tax, in PROPERTY TAXES, 87-116 (Tax Pol'y League ed., 1940). I discount
these arguments in part because I believe they rest on valuation complaints. It is also argu-
able that they simply raise the basic complaint about the property tax-that it falls to corre-
spond to ability to pay.
The net worth solution has not been acceptable, probably because of the difficulty of
locating and assessing all personal property, and because of the perceived liquidity problems
posed by any property tax. As presently constituted, the property tax in most states is a tax
on real property and on special categories of personal property such as automobiles and
boats. It is easy to understand why these particular categories of personal property are taxed
while other categories are not. Land is immovable, and boats and automobiles are licensed,
and, consequently, are easily traced. A few states do levy a tax on intangible property. See
John A. Miller, American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County: The Quiet Passing of the
Separate Incidence Rule, 41 TAX LAW. 831, 839 n.58 (1988). Generally, no deduction is
allowed for debt associated with the property. Thus, as taxes on wealth, most property taxes
are inherently flawed from a theoretical perspective both with respect to coverage and with
respect to the nominal base.
Generally speaking, the property tax base has been eroding since World War I. See
Ronald B. Welch, The Property Tax Under Pressure: A Policymaker's Guide (Lincoln Inst.
Land Pol'y, Tax Pol'y Roundtable Prop. Tax Papers Series No. TPR-4, 1980). A tax on all
property is sometimes referred to as a "general property tax." This is distinguished from the
"classified property tax" which is levied upon relatively narrow classes of property, often at
different rates. See Leland, supra, at 83.
The flawed treatment of debt may not be as much of a problem as it seems if in-
stead of regarding the property tax as a tax on wealth, we regard it as a surrogate tax on
income from property or consumption of property. These alternate conceptual bases for the
property tax are addressed in part IV of this Article.
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that is not the question. The question presented is whether the Su-
preme Court was correct in deciding that the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution is not violated by Proposition 13's
conversion of the California property tax system from a value based
assessment system to an acquisition-cost based assessment system.
That is a very different question altogether. As will be discussed, it is
a question whose answer depends on the answer to another question:
does an acquisition-cost property tax system have a rational basis?
We can begin to answer that question by gaining an understanding of
the changes wrought by Proposition 13.
B. Proposition 13
Proposition 13 is the popular name for a statewide ballot initia-
tive passed by the voters of the state of California in 1978.29 Propo-
29. See CAL. CONST. arL XIHA. Article XIIIA must be read in conjunction with Article
XIII in order to be properly understood. Article XIII provides:
§ 1. Taxable property; percentage; full value
Sec. 1. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or the laws of the
United States:
(a) All property is taxable and shall be assessed at the same
percentage of fair market value. When a value standard other than
fair market value is prescribed by this Constitution or by statute
authorized by this Constitution, the same percentage shall be ap-
plied to determine the assessed value. The value to which the
percentage is applied, whether it be the fair market value or not,
shall be known for property tax purposes as the full value.
(b) All property so assessed shall be taxed in proportion to its
full value.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII (West Supp. 1993).
Article XIIIA then provides:
§ 1. Ad valorem tax on real property; maximum amount; application
Section 1.
(a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real proper-
ty shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of
such property. The one percent (1%) tax shall be collected by the
counties and apportioned according to law to the districts within
the counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply
to ad valorem taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and
redemption charges on any of the following:
(I) Any indebtedness approved by the voters prior to July
1, 1978.
(2) Any bonded indebtedness, not subject to paragraph (3),
for the acquisition or improvement of real property approved




§ 2. Full cash value; reassessment; newly constructed property; seismic safety;
value and location of replacement dwelling; full cash value base; change in owner-
ship; family transfers
Sec. 2.
(a) The full cash value means the county assessor's valuation of
real property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under "full cash
value" or, thereafter, the appraised value of real property when
purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has oc-
curred after the 1975 assessment. All real property not already
assessed up to the 1975-76 full cash value may be reassessed to
reflect that valuation. For purposes of this section, "newly con-
structed" does not include real property which is reconstructed after
a disaster, as declared by the Governor, where the fair market
value of the real property, as reconstructed, is comparable to its
fair market value prior to the disaster. Also, the term "newly con-
structed" shall not include the portion of reconstruction or improve-
ment to a structure, constructed of unreinforced masonry bearing
wall construction, necessary to comply with any local ordinance
relating to seismic safety during the first 15 years following that
reconstruction or improvement.
However, the Legislature may provide that under appropriate
circumstances and pursuant to definitions and procedures established
by the Legislature, any person over the age of 55 years who re-
sides in property which is eligible for the homeowner's exemption
under subdivision (k) of Section 3 of Article XIII and any imple-
menting legislation may transfer the base year value of the property
entitled to exemption, with the adjustments authorized by subdivi-
sion (b), to any replacement dwelling of equal or lesser value
located within the same county and purchased or newly constructed
by that person as his or her principal residence within two years of
the sale of the original property. For purposes of this section, "any
person over the age of 55 years" includes a married couple one
member of which is over the age of 55 years. For purposes of this
section, "replacement dwelling" means a building, structure, or other
shelter constituting a place of abode, whether real property or per-
sonal property, and any land on which it may be situated. For
purposes of this section, a two-dwelling unit shall be considered as
two separate single-family dwellings. This paragraph shall apply to
any replacement dwelling which was purchased or newly construct-
ed on or after November 5, 1986.
In addition, the Legislature may authorize each county board
of supervisors, after consultation with the local affected agencies
within the county's boundaries, to adopt an ordinance making the
provisions of this subdivision relating to transfer of base year value
also applicable to situations in which the replacement dwellings are
located in that county and the original properties are located in
another county within this state. For purposes of this paragraph,
"local affected agency" means any city, special district, school
district, or community college district which receives an annual
property tax revenue allocation. This paragraph shall apply to any
replacement dwelling which was purchased or newly constructed on
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or after the date the county adopted the provisions of this subdivi-
sion relating to transfer of base year value, but shall not apply to
any replacement dwelling which was purchased or newly construct-
ed before November 9, 1988.
(b) The full cash value base may reflect from year to year the
inflationary rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year or
reduction as shown in the consumer price index or comparable data
for the area under taxing jurisdiction, or may be reduced to reflect
substantial damage, destruction or other factors causing a decline in
value.
(c) For purposes of subdivision (a), the Legislature may provide
that the term "newly constructed" shall not include any of the
following:
(1) The construction or addition of any active solar energy
system.
(2) The construction or installation of any fire sprinkler
system, other fire extinguishing system, fire detection system,
or fire-related egress improvement, as defined by the Legisla-
ture, which is constructed or installed after the effective date
of this paragraph.
(3) The construction, installation, or modification on or
after the effective date of this paragraph of any portion or
structural component of a single or multiple family dwelling
which is eligible for the homeowner's exemption if the con-
struction, installation, or modification is for the purpose of
making the dwelling more accessible to severely disabled
person.
(4) The construction or installation of seismic retrofitting
improvements or improvements utilizing earthquake hazard
mitigation technologies, which are constructed or installed in
existing buildings after the effective date of this paragraph.
The Legislature shall define eligible improvements. This
exclusion does not apply to seismic safety reconstruction or
improvements which qualify for exclusion pursuant to the
last sentence of the first paragraph of subdivision (a).
(d) For purposes of this section, the term "change in ownership"
shall not include the acquisition of real property as a replacement
for comparable property if the person acquiring the real property
has been displaced from the property replaced by eminent domain
proceedings, by acquisition by a public entity, or governmental
action which has resulted in a judgment of inverse condemnation.
The real property acquired shall be deemed comparable to the
property replaced if it is similar in size, utility, and function, or if
it conforms to state regulations defined by the Legislature govern-
ing the relocation of persons displaced by governmental actions.
The provisions of this subdivision shall be applied to any property
acquired after March 1, 1975, but shall affect only those assess-
ments of that property which occur after the provisions of this
subdivision take effect.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Leg-
islature shall provide that the base-year value of property which is
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substantially damaged or destroyed by a disaster, as declared by the
Governor, may be transferred to comparable property, within the
same county, that is acquired or newly constructed as a replace-
ment for the substantially damaged or destroyed property.
This subdivision shall apply to any comparable replacement
property acquired or newly constructed on or after July 1, 1985,
and to the determination of base-year values for the 1985-86 fiscal
year and fiscal years thereafter.
(f) For the purposes of subdivision (e):
(1) Property is substantially damaged or destroyed if it
sustains physical damage amounting to more than 50 percent
of its value immediately before the disaster. Damage includes
a diminution in the value of property as a result of restricted
access caused by the disaster.
(2) Replacement property is comparable to the property
substantially damaged or destroyed if it is similar in size,
utility, and function to the property which it replaces, and if
the fair market value of the acquired property is comparable
to the fair market value of the replaced property prior to the
disaster.
(g) For purposes of subdivision (a), the terms "purchased" and
"change in ownership" shall not include the purchase or transfer of
real property between spouses since March 1, 1975, including, but
not limited to, all of the following:
(1) Transfers to a trustee for the beneficial use of a
spouse, or the surviving spouse of a deceased transferor, or
by a trustee of such a trust to the spouse of the trustor.
(2) Transfers to a spouse which take effect upon the death
of a spouse.
(3) Transfers to a spouse or former spouse in connection
with a property settlement agreement or decree of dissolution
of a marriage or legal separation.
(4) The creation, transfer, or termination, solely between
spouses, of any coowner's interest.
(5) The distribution of a legal entity's property to a
spouse or former spouse in exchange for the interest of the
spouse in the legal entity in connection with a property
settlement agreement or a decree of dissolution of a marriage
or legal separation.
(h) For purposes of subdivision (a), the terms "purchased" and
"change of ownership" shall not include the purchase or transfer of
the principal residence of the transferor in the case of a purchase
or transfer between parents and their children, as defined by the
Legislature, and the purchase or transfer of the first $1,000,000 of
the full cash value of all other real property between parents and
their children, as defined by the Legislature. This subdivision shall
apply to both voluntary transfers and transfers resulting from a
court order or judicial decree.
(i) Unless specifically provided otherwise, amendments to this
section adopted prior to November 1, 1988, shall be effective for
changes in ownership which occur, and new construction which is
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sition 13 was the product of what we would now call a taxpayer re-
volt." It has been described as "a revolt of the haves" because its
strongest support came from higher income white males.3, It con-
tained several property tax amendments to the state constitution, in-
cluding rate limits and limits on assessment increases. But the key
provision in Proposition 13, which was at issue in Nordlinger, con-
cerned the assessment base for real property taxation. This portion of
the initiative provided that real property should be assessed at "full
cash value" ("FCV"), which was defined as "the assessed valuation as
of the 1975-76 tax year or, thereafter, the appraised value of real
property when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in owner-
ship has occurred after the 1975 assessment."32 The consequence of
this provision was that the assessed value of real property acquired
before 1976 became fixed at 1975 assessed values. Property acquired
after 1976 was assessed at its date of sale fair market value, that is,
at its cost. Assessment increases for all property were thereafter limit-
ed to two percent per year. Since, over time, real property values
tend to rise, comparably housed individuals were nearly certain to be
taxed differently depending on when they purchased their homes with
the most recent purchasers bearing a disproportionately large share of
the total tax burden.33 Thus, after the enactment of Proposition 13, a
tiered scheme of property taxation was in place in California which
systematically favored long term property owners over newer owners.
This scheme is described as an acquisition-cost based property tax.
One can readily understand why the large majority of homeown-
completed, after the effective date of the amendment. Unless specif-
ically provided otherwise, amendments to this section adopted after
November 1, 1988, shall be effective for changes in ownership
which occur, and new construction which is completed, on or after
the effective date of the amendment.
§ 3. Changes in state taxes; enactments to increase revenues; imposition
Sec. 3. From and after the effective date of this article, any changes in
State taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursu-
ant thereto whether by increased rates or changes in methods of computa-
tion must be imposed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all
members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature, except that
no new ad valorem taxes on real property, or sales or transaction taxes
on the sales of real property may be imposed.
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
30. For a brief history of the "California Tax Revolt," see DAvID 0. SEARS & JACK
Cr'RiN, TAX REvOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA, 19-43 (1985).
31. Id. at 220.
32. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a). For the text of this provision see supra note 29.
33. As measured by the present value of their homes.
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ers would have supported Proposition 13.' First, it dramatically low-
ered property taxes." Second, it froze the tax rate and it largely
froze assessments in order to prevent future increases -in property
taxes. 6 In addition, there was particular appeal to the baser instincts
of voters because the provision contained within its terms the oppor-
tunity to minimize one's own taxes while also increasing the taxes
borne by others. 7 As will be discussed later, these last two factors
need not have been interrelated. That is, the tax freeze could have
been implemented without discriminating against latecomers. This is
an important point because the justifications offered for Proposition
13 rest primarily upon the freeze element, not the discrimination element.38
34. A survey by the Los Angeles Times on election day showed that 81% of homeown-
ers with no state or local worker in the home supported Proposition 13. Jack Citrin & Frank
Levy, From 13 to 4 and Beyond: The Political Meaning of the Ongoing Tax Revolt in Cali-
fornia, in THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT 1, 10 (George T. Kaufman & Kenneth T. Rosen eds.,
1985). Proposition 13 was adopted by a margin of two-to-one. See Lefcoe & Allison, supra
note 14, at 174. By its terms the provision cannot be amended with less than a two-thirds
majority of all the members of both legislative houses, See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3. A
voter initiative can also amend the provision. Thus, if it is ever to be voluntarily repealed,
another powerful movement will have to be assembled. The difference-and this is a telling
one-is that most of those persons voting for repeal would be voting against their economic
self-interest. In its amicus brief, the League of Women Voters argued that "Proposition 13
reflects a breakdown of the political process that has resulted in an inequity that cannot be
cured absent judicial intervention." Brief of The League of Women Voters of California as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 37, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992)
(No. 90-1912).
35. Initial estimates were that Proposition 13 would reduce local government revenues
by $7 billion in the 1978-79 fiscal year alone. William H. Oakland, Proposition 13: Genesis
and Consequences, in THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT 31, 44 (George G. Kaufman & Kenneth
T. Rosen eds., 1981). Prior to Proposition 13 the statewide effective tax rate was running at
about 2.5%. Id. at 31.
36. The tax freeze portion of Proposition 13 was not at issue in Nordlinger, nor is it a
central issue in this Article. As will be discussed later, revenue capping could have been
accomplished without the necessity of discriminating against latecomers.
37. The ability to achieve relative superiority over one's neighbors has been recognized
as a powerful motivator. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE LJ. 1,
28-48 (1992).
Whether it is termed "status," "prestige," or "distinction," people sometimes
seek-as an end in itself-relative position; they measure their income against the
prevailing "standard of living" of their society or their peers, suffer indignity at
failing to "keep up with the Joneses," and generally gain or lose satisfaction ac-
cording to how well they do compared to others.
Id. at 3. "[T]he social science evidence suggests that people generally share a strong desire
for social distinction, and in particular that people desire relatively high income and the
goods associated with high income or status." Id. at 48. Obviously, one who pays less taxes
will have relatively more income to spend than other people who are otherwise similarly
situated in economic terms.
38. However, it is interesting to note that the ability of Proposition 13 to raise more
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The package placed before the voters, however, contained both
elements. Subsequent events reveal that Proposition 13 functioned
effectively both as a tax freeze device for established homeowners
and as a tax discrimination device with respect to latecomers. Over
time as real property continued to appreciate, each new buyer bore a
greater share of the tax burden than did her comparably housed
neighbor who happened to have bought her home at an earlier point
in time when values were lower.39 Thus, those taxpayers who bene-
fitted most from Proposition 13 benefitted in two ways (over and
above the immediate tax cut). First, they were assured that their taxes
would not increase precipitously. Second, they were assured that the
government services they desired would still be available because
others would not be taxed as lightly as themselves.'
This, then, was the cleverness of Proposition 13, a well calculat-
ed appeal to self-interest and to majoritarian rule. All those homeown-
ers who voted for its enactment were voting in their own economic
self-interest" and, in some respects, against the self-interest of per-
revenue over time by taxing newcomers more heavily than established homeowners was of-
fered as evidence of its rationality by at least one anicus in the case. See Brief of Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10,
Nordlinger (No. 90-1912) ("The reassessment upon change of ownership provision is an inte-
gral part of Article XIIIA's operation which advances the policy of providing a stable reve-
nue source for local governments."). This argument apparently accepts that discrimination can
be justified on the principle that the money had to come from somewhere. "[I]f these were
the only two provisions of Article XIIIA [referring to the rate and assessment caps] local
governments would have gone bankrupt long ago." Id. at 26. The Court's opinion in
Nordlinger does not expressly accept the principle that discrimination can be justified by
revenue needs, but it may well have been influenced by this argument since it did adopt a
reliance interest argument that bears some similarity to the revenue argument. See infra part
III.B.
39. A recent study showed, for example, that property in San Bernardino County that
had been subject to sale in the 1990-91 assessment year bore on average 3.91 times the tax
liability of property of equal value that had been held since 1978. See Ter A. Sexton et al.,
Equity of an Acquisition-Value Property Tax: The Case of Proposition 13, 15 ST. TAX NOTES
37, 38 (1992).
40. Sears & Citrin found that most voters supporting Proposition 13 held contradictory
attitudes toward tax and spending reform. The taxpayers wanted tax relief without reduction
in government services, that is, the taxpayers wanted "something for nothing." SEARS &
CRMN, supra note 30, at 70-71, 91-95. In the Supreme Court, Nordlinger argued that Propo-
sition 13's enactment resulted from the "naked political calculation" of those persons who
wanted to minimize their own taxes while keeping government services high. Petitioner's
Brief on the Merits at 37, Nordlinger (No. 90-1912) (noting also that two-thirds of those
voters who voted for Proposition 13 owned their own homes).
41. Most voters who were also homeowners anticipated that they would save money if
Proposition 13 passed and thus, their support for Proposition 13 increased with the size of
their anticipated tax reduction. Citrin & Levy, supra note 34, at 10-11. According to
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sons, many of whom, such as young people and future residents, had
no vote.42 Moreover, the extent of this cleverness is further revealed
when one considers how each succeeding wave of California home
buyers was likely to feel compelled to accept its terms. Though the
pre-1976 homeowners were the biggest beneficiaries of Proposition
13, those homeowners who followed them received a benefit as well
because their assessments were frozen at their homes' respective fair
market values as of their dates of purchase. The freeze mechanism of
Proposition 13 was "a spoon full of sugar" to help the discrimination
medicine go down. As long as home prices kept on rising and as
long as the latecomer did not perceive the freeze effect as separate
from the discrimination effect, she was likely to conclude that Propo-
sition 13 was better than the apparent alternative of escalating market
value assessments. And, of course, though the latecomers might look
with envy at their neighbors who bought prior to 1976, they could
also look at those who followed them and see that there was someone
worse off than they. With the passage of time, each succeeding buyer
had the satisfaction of seeing that someone else was receiving even
worse treatment than she was. Only the most recent buyers had no
one to feel superior to. However, even they could look forward to the
day when the law would tax someone else more heavily than it taxed
them. Yet the increased tax burden borne by new buyers may well
have prevented many potential homeowners from ever buying in the
first place. Actual new buyers who planned to own their homes for a
prolonged period could reasonably expect that their relative share of
the general tax burden would decline as more and more new buyers
came along to shoulder a greater portion of the general tax burden.43
Nordlinger's Supreme Court brief, two-thirds of those voters who voted for Proposition 13
were homeowners. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 37, Nordlinger (No. 90-1912).
There was a turnout of 69% of the registered voters in the vote on Proposition 13. Citrin &
Levy, supra note 34, at 8. Sixty-six percent of the voting age population of California was
registered to vote. Id. Surveys just before the election showed that 69% of all owners favored
Proposition 13 while only 47% of renters favored it. Id. at 9.
42. The underrepresentation in the vote of those persons most harmed by Proposition 13
is one of its troubling aspects. Arguably, this is a defect of constitutional concern. See dis-
cussion infra part II.C.2.
43. It should be apparent that this view of Proposition 13 depends on the existence of
a rising market. As long as real estate continues to appreciate, the scenario just described
will hold true. For most of the period since the enactment of Proposition 13, there has been
a rising real estate market in California. The long term trend of real estate generally is to
appreciate. Of course much of this appreciation is a function of inflation. More recently, the
real estate market in California has suffered some declines. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Southern
California is Rattled as Prices of Homes Keep Falling, WALL ST. J.. Oct. 13, 1992, at Al.
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For the initial beneficiaries of Proposition 13, this is in fact what
happened. As the Nordlinger opinion noted, by 1989 those homeown-
ers who had owned their homes since 1978 constituted forty-four
percent of all homeowners but paid only twenty-five percent of all
residential property taxes levied that year." The opinion does not
state what portion of all homes, as measured by value, were held by
that forty-four percent. It is possible that the housing of long term
owners is generally more valuable than that of short term owners. If
so, the established homeowners are escaping more in taxes (measured
by value) than the above numbers reveal.
The discriminatory aspects of Proposition 13 are readily observ-
able in its main features, but are further emphasized by certain other
subsidiary rules concerning transfers between related parties. These
include a provision allowing children who buy their parents' home to
retain their parents' assessment and a provision allowing children who
inherit their parents' home or who receive their parents' home by gift
to retain their parents' assessment.45 Thus, Proposition 13 creates a
hereditary right to a low property tax assessment for property passed
from parent to child by sale, gift, devise, or inheritance. In addition,
Proposition 13 provides similar advantages with respect to transfers
between spouses.' It also allows for the retention of one's old as-
sessment for new property acquired by persons over the age of fifty-
five or for property acquired as a result of certain casualties and
involuntary conversions with respect to one's old property.47
The discriminatory aspects of Proposition 13 are not limited to
discrimination between residential homeowners. For example, over
time homeowners as a class are likely to bear a greater share of the
tax burden than owners of commercial property because homes sell
However, Proposition 13 does not prohibit reduction in assessed values when the market
value of property drops below its assessed value. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(b); State
Bd. of Equalization v. Supervisors of San Diego County, 164 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Ct. App. 1980).
Thus, Proposition 13 permits assessments to go down but not to go up except in small incre-
ments of two percent per year. It discriminates in a most complete fashion in favor of the
established property owner over the newcomer. But it ensures that most of those injured by
its terms will refrain from seeking to change back to a market value system because such a
change would cause their assessments to go even higher. In any event, voter-inspired rever-
sion to a value-based system is extremely unlikely because Proposition 13 also contained a
supermajority requirement for its amendment. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
44. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (1992).
45. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(h). For the text of this provision, see supra note 29.
46. Id. § 2(g). For the text of this provision see supra note 29.
47. Id. § 2(d)-(e). For the text of these provisions see supra note 29.
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more often and because commercial property can be sold indirectly
through sales of corporate stock.4" Other discriminatory aspects of
Proposition 13 have been described elsewhere,49 and will not be ad-
dressed in this Article.
As I have just described, Proposition 13 institutionalized a taxing
scheme built on "relative preferences""0 among taxpayers. An eco-
nomic hierarchy was created preferring one person relative to another
by reference to the order in which they acquired their property, and a
"first come, first served" system became the order of the day. As will
be discussed, this form of taxation is directly contrary to traditional
notions of tax equity. Indeed, it is a tax which treats traditional no-
tions of equity with contempt.
C. The Equal Protection Clause and the Rational Basis Test
1. In General
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."'" The clause "imposes a disability
on state lawmaking; it is a test of invalidity."52 Among all of the
Fourteenth Amendment's process-oriented provisions, the Equal Pro-
48. See Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 14, at 197.
49. See id. at 196-201.
50. Professor McAdams uses the phrase "relative preferences" as the title of his article
detailing his belief in the importance for economic and social theory of the pursuit of relative
position. McAdams, supra note 37, at 3.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause and the rational basis
test have been the subjects of a wealth of legal scholarship, including: Robert W. Bennett,
"Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL.
L. REV. 1049 (1979); Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1980); William Cohen, Federalism in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Cohen, A Com-
ment on Metropolitan Life]; William Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A Comment on
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County Commission, 38 UCLA L. REv. 87 (1990)
[hereinafter Cohen, A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh]; Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Pur-
pose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1992); Robert J.
Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 261 (1990); Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Hans
A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976); Frank I. Michelman,
Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 487 (1979); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus Tenbroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). For additional references, see Farrell, supra, at 2 n.1.
52. Michael Bayles, Hart vs. Dworkin, 10 LAW & PHIL. 349, 354 (1991).
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tection Clause "by its explicit concern with equality among persons
within a state's jurisdiction . . constitutes the document's clearest,
though not sole, recognition that technical access to the process may
not always be sufficient to guarantee good-faith representation of all
those putatively represented."53
Though the Equal Protection Clause could be read as a flat pro-
hibition against discriminatory legislation, as construed by the Su-
preme Court, it does not forbid the use of classifications or other
legislative schemes that differentiate between people or property.' In
the tax context, "[tihe Equal Protection Clause 'applies only to taxa-
tion which in fact bears unequally on persons or property of the same
class."55 Implicit in this language is the assumption that the classifi-
cations employed will not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Otherwise,
classification schemes could be used by legislatures to discriminate
between persons and properties that properly should be treated as
members of the same class. This implicit assumption has been ex-
pressly stated as a requirement that the classification must "rationally
further a legitimate state interest."56 This is a lenient standard which
simply requires that the classification scheme must be reasonable.57
Is the notion of rationality a determinate legal concept? I like to
believe it is; maybe it's the romantic in me. Whether constitutional
law and, indeed, whether law generally is little more than a swamp of
indeterminacy has often been debated.56 The generality of the lan-
53. ELY, supra note 4, at 98.
54. As Professor Ely has pointed out, a ban on all unequal treatment would hardly be
feasible. Classification based on generalities is an unavoidable aspect of rulemaking. See id. at
30-31.
55. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989) (quot-
ing Charleston Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 190 (1945)).
56. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2331-32 (1992).
57. Glennon, supra note 51, at 267; see also Cohen, A Comment on Allegheny Pitts-
burgh, supra note 51, at 93 ("The requirement that legislative classifications bear a rational
relationship to an appropriate legislative purpose is easily met.").
58. See Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and
the Potential For Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988);
Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nwv. U. L. REV. 148 (1990); Owen M. Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Steve Fuller, Playing Without a
Full Deck: Scientific Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 549
(1988); Kent Greenawalt, How Can Law Be Determinate?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1990);
Frederic R. Kellogg, Legal Scholarship in the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism's Response to
Critical Legal Studies, 65 TUL. L. REV. 15 (1990); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy,
77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989); Robert J. Lipkin, Indeterminacy, Justification and Truth in
Constitutional Theory, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1992); David Millon, Objectivity and De-
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guage employed in the Constitution and in the cases interpreting it
lends itself to such a debate. Perhaps an indeterminist would contend
that the rational basis test is nothing more than a coded reference to
the power of the majority of the Supreme Court to do whatever it
chooses for whatever reasons it chooses in any case where the ratio-
nal basis test is deemed to apply. For reasons offered later on, I do
not accede to this view of the rational basis test. I believe it can be a
meaningful standard by which to gauge the soundness of state tax
enactments. However, the rationality standard is significantly depen-
dent upon context and upon the exercise of human judgment. It is a
flexible standard that directs the Court to do the right thing.59 The
mocracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHt. L. REV. 462 (1987); John Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100
HARV. L. REv. 332 (1986); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990). There is what amounts to a symposium on the topic of legal
indeterminacy in a recent issue of the Northwestern University Law Review. See 85 Nw. U.
L. REV. 113, 113-89 (1990). An even more recent issue of the Harvard Journal of Law and
Public Policy presented a collection of articles on the related topic of the relationship be-
tween rules and the rule of law. See 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615-852 (1991). There
has been a great deal written on this topic, and I do not offer here a complete catalogue.
The topic is a big one and its limits are ill-defined. Often the matter of legal indeterminacy
is a beginning point for development of some other theme such as the belief that law is
politics, that law is power or the negation of those views. For my views on legal indetermi-
nacy in the context of tax law, see Miller, supra note 19.
59. This does not necessarily mean that the rational basis test is indeterminate. If we
believe that the proper application of the rational basis test requires doing the right thing,
then in a broad sense, the test is determinative of the outcome when we do the right thing.
See Kress. supra note 58, at 320-22. I simply mean to say that the rational basis test would
have permitted a finding for Ms. Nordlinger and against the constitutionality of Proposition
13 if this were the right thing to do. That this is so is readily demonstrable, I believe, by
the cases discussed infra part II.C.3. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488
U.S. 336 (1989) and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
Of course, in a sense, the law is always indeterminate when a case reaches the Su-
preme Court because the Court is not restrained in any formal sense from deciding the case
in the manner it likes. The law depends upon the Justices' willingness to decide cases ac-
cording to law. For present purposes, I assume that willingness.
I recognize that the short shrift I have thus far given to Equal Protection theorizing
may grate on the nerves of constitutional scholars, just as the short shrift they give tax theo-
ry grates upon me. If any of them think I am wrong in saying that the rational basis test is
flexible enough to have allowed the Court do the right thing in Nordlinger. I invite them to
correct me. But when they do so. I ask that they take account of what it means to do the
right thing from a tax theory perspective as part of considering what is the right thing from
a constitutional law perspective. In other words, I ask them to actually attempt to compre-
hend the failings of Proposition 13 as a tax measure in considering what is the right thing.
If they can do this and still conclude that the rational basis test bars the Court from over-
turning the measure, I will be greatly surprised. After all, the concept of rationality is inher-
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real question then becomes "what is the right thing?"
In practice, the rational basis test has not operated as a major
restraint on state and local taxation. On only a handful of occasions
has it been used to invalidate classification schemes or practices.'
Part of the leniency of the test is that the rationality of the classifica-
tion is often considered independent of proof of actual legislative
purpose.6 In other words, the Court may simply think of a reason
for the classification employed. If it is satisfied by that reason, it may
uphold the classification based on that reason even though that reason
was not expressly adopted by the legislature when it created the clas-
sification.62 Another reason for the leniency of the test is that the
Court recognizes that tax laws are complex creations with inherently
political aspects. The legislature is seen as a more fit arena than the
Court for the crafting of revenue raising measures.63
2. Is There a Basis for "More Exacting Judicial Scrutiny"? 6'
It might be argued that Proposition 13's unfairness is a substan-
ently contextual.
60. See PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION,
§ 3:1 (1981); see also Farrell, supra note 51, at 2; Glennon, supra note 51, at 287 ("The
Court has been so deferential in rational basis review of state tax schemes that it has not
found a violation of equal protection since 1933 [until Allegheny].").
61. This approach has been criticized. Gunther argued that only actual purposes should
be considered. See Gunther, supra note 51, at 20-21.
62. Farrell, supra note 51, at 22-25 (noting, however, that on occasion the Court has
looked for the "actual purpose of governmental action"). On the other hand, it is sometimes
argued that legislative purpose is irrelevant. See id. at 20 (arguing that the Supreme Court
does not take actual legislative intent into account). The view that legislative purpose is irrel-
evant is supportable on several grounds, including the lack of a legislative mind with which
to form a purpose and the likely existence of multiple purposes. Id. at 9 n.36 (citing Max
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870 (1930)). In the end, it seems to
me that the main justification for this disregard of legislative intent is the argument that
language has an objective meaning that does not depend on the motivation of its speaker for
rational meaning. If this is so, then the language of a statute has an intrinsic meaning that is
determinable from the language itself. To allow this meaning to be overturned by some as-
sumed underlying purpose, renders the statute a virtual nullity. See generally Schauer, supra
note 58, at 534.
63. Of course, Proposition 13 was crafted by neither the Court nor the California state
legislature. For a discussion of whether judicial review should differ with respect to voter
initiatives as compared to regular legislation, see Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990) (arguing that judicial review should be more stringent
with respect to expressions of direct democracy).
64. As is discussed infra part III.B.1, Nordlinger, as a new homeowner, argued that
there was a basis for strict scrutiny of Proposition 13 due to infringement of the right to
travel. The basis for heightened scrutiny offered below is more diffuse and less doctrinally
conventional.
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tive matter that by itself cannot reach the level of a compelling con-
stitutional concern." In order to raise such a constitutional concern,
the argument might be that, there must have been a flaw in either the
process by which Proposition 13 came into being or in the processes
created by Proposition 13.' These procedural flaws, if found, could
justify a "more exacting judicial scrutiny" directed toward Proposition
13.67 While I do not concede the need for more exacting scrutiny,
65. As I have indicated, it is a common view that the rational basis test should be
applied by the courts with much timidity. This is certainly a supportable idea. It is offered as
a principled defence of the supremacy of the democratic process over the arguably more
oligarchical judicial process. The logical progression for this view is the argument for the
judicial renunciation of the rational basis test. Some commentators have done so. See ELY,
supra note 4, at 110 n.10; Cohen, A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh, supra note 51, at
104-05; Linde, supra note 51, at 220-22. 1 will leave the question of renunciation to the
constitutionalists. In this Article I have proceeded as though the rational basis test is a fact
(though an ambiguous one) of the legal terrain. This view of the law was suggested to me
by Professor Anthony D'Amato. See Letter from Anthony D'Amato, Professor, Northwestern
University School of Law, to John A. Miller, Associate Professor, University of Idaho Col-
lege of Law 1 (Feb. 3, 1993) (on file with author). For persons such as myself who are
outsiders to constitutional theorizing, I believe the sensible thing to do is to take the rational
basis test at face value and then to argue the merits of the individual case. If we do this,
then we would say that when the democratic process brings forth a highly irrational product,
the rational basis test says the Court should intervene on the side of reason-on the side of
justice.
Some constitutional experts will find my views strikingly naive. It is clear to me from
conversations with a number of constitutional scholars that their views of the rational basis
test are formed of impressions having little connection with the language employed by the
Court to describe it. Equal Protection analysis is viewed by some of those scholars as shaped
almost entirely by standard of review analysis, i.e., the process of choosing between strict
scrutiny review, intermediate review, and rational basis review. From this perspective, once
the standard of review is determined, the outcome in the case is largely determined. My chief
complaint with this approach is that it results in relatively little individualized consideration
of cases. Even the Supreme Court, I would argue, should define its primary role by reference
to the goal of achieving justice in the case before it. The rule that arises from the case
should be secondary. In my view, then, analytical constructs, like the standard of review
mechanism described above, tend to reduce cases to mere abstractions and defeat the goal of
individual justice.
My view of the rational basis test is pragmatic. Whether the Court affirms or reverses
in a case involving the rational basis test, it is obliged to pass judgment. That judgment can
be right or wrong, good or bad. The language employed to describe the rational basis test is
flexible enough to permit the court to do the right thing. In the immediate context, the Alle-
gheny case proves this. Given that freedom, the Court should do the right thing. Then the
question becomes what is the right thing.
66. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 4. at 101 ("The American Constitution has thus by and
large remained a constitution properly so called, concerned with constitutive questions. What
has distinguished it, and indeed the United States itself, has been a process of government,
not a governing ideology." (footnotes omitted)); see also Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts.
and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider", 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1296 (1986) (offering a
critical view of process ideology).
67. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The cited
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Proposition 13 does raise important process concerns that, at a mini-
mum, justify what Gerald Gunther called rationality review with
"bite."68
Two-thirds of those voters who voted for Proposition 13 in 1978
were existing homeowners.69 Those California homeowners were vot-
ing their pocketbooks." It is worth recalling that, first and foremost,
Proposition 13 was billed as a tax cut of immense proportions.' A
contemporaneous survey showed that most voters who were also
homeowners anticipated they would save money if Proposition 13
passed, and that their support for Proposition 13 grew with the size
of their anticipated tax reduction. 2 The fact that existing homeown-
ers controlled the vote on a property tax measure is not by itself a
ground for striking down such a measure if it passes or even a
ground for strict scrutiny. But in Proposition 13's case, there are two
particular reasons for concern.
footnote, as every constitutional scholar knows, is "the most celebrated footnote in constitu-
tional law" See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUNM. L. REV. 1087,
1088 n.4 (1982) (collecting authorities analyzing the Carolene Products footnote). I make this
reference to Carolene Products without any claim of exact usage. My intent is simply to
signal the general direction of my comments. For those whose sense of completeness is vio-
lated by mere allusion, the text of the footnote is set out below.
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of unde-
sirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation ...
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious or national or racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
68. See Gunther, supra note 51, at 18-22. Gunther favored a means-oriented rationality
review that focused on actual as opposed to conjectural legislative purposes. Id. at 20-21. I
believe that my analysis of Nordlinger fits the Gunther model.
69. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 38, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326
(1992) (No. 90-1912).
70. See supra note 41.
71. It reduced property taxes by $7 billion in its first year. See Steven T. Lawrence,
Solving the Proposition 13 Puzzle: From Amador to Nordlinger-Judicial Challenges and
Alternatives, 24 PAC. LJ. 1769. 1775 (1993).
72. Citrin & Levy, supra note 34, at 10-11.
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First, in Proposition 13 the homeowner/voters were casting a tax
burden upon future homeowners that they did not intend to share
themselves.73 When we vote for a traditional property tax levy, such
as a local school bond issue, or a tax cut, this is not the case. We
can reasonably say to latecomers who might complain about the levy,
"You have to pay the tax, but so do I. In some respects at least,
when I voted on that bond levy I was thinking of your interests as
well as mine." We can argue, in short, that the newcomer's interests
were represented in the election by the existing homeowners.74 This
is an illustration of the concept of "virtual representation."75
Virtual representation is not as readily observable when we levy
a tax that discriminates in favor of current homeowners and against
later home purchasers. Suppose, for example, that Proposition 13 had
completely exempted current homeowners, but not future homeowners,
from paying property taxes on their homes. Would we say that those
homeowners have the same interest in voting for or against Proposi-
tion 13 as those subsequent purchasers? Of course not. One might
argue that my analogy is too extreme to be meaningful. But consider
that year after year the Stephanie Nordlingers of California will pay
three, four, or five times as much in property taxes as their neigh-
bors. In some cases they may pay ten or twenty times as much in
property taxes as their comparably housed neighbors.76 Those exist-
ing homeowners who voted in the 1978 initiative on Proposition 13
had a different stake in the outcome than did the latecomers. Virtual
representation is not easily found in such a circumstance.
73. Of course, many decisions taken today will affect future generations who have no
say in the matter. The government's deficit spending is a classic example of this. The differ-
ence with Proposition 13 lies in the fact that the California homeowners/voters were confer-
ring a benefit upon themselves that accrues simultaneously with the detriment to the non-
voting latecomer.
74. This includes the seller's interest since the sale price may have been reduced by the
tax increase. The seller may not bear the tax in the same way under Proposition 13 since it
discourages sales of homes in many cases and thus may have shrunk the supply of available
homes sufficient to counter the effect of the tax increase on market prices.
75. See ELY, supra note 4, at 82-83 (discussing the historical roots as well as the fail-
ings and strengths of the concept of "virtual representation"). This historical approach to
constitutional analysis has particular relevance to what Professor Ely calls "distributions" (as
opposed to "constitutional entitlements"). "The constitutionality of most distributions thus
cannot be determined simply by looking to see who ended up with what, but rather can be
approached intelligibly only by attending to the process that brought about the distribution in
question .... " Id. at 135-36. In this analysis, Professor Ely draws upon the work of Robert
Nozick. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 153-55 (1974). For a criticism
of the theory of virtual representation, see Brilmayer, supra note 66, at 1310-15.
76. See infra part IV.
[Vol. 22:79
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROPERTY TAX
Over time the group of latecomers will be largely composed of
people who had no vote when Proposition 13 was passed because
they were minors or non-residents or both at the time of the vote.
Who was representing those latecomers' interests at the time Proposi-
tion 13 was being voted upon? How does a group that by definition
has no present active coherence (future homeowners) at the time of
the vote get adequately represented in an initiative that isolates them
as the target of that initiative?'
The unrepresentativeness of the vote on Proposition 13 takes on
an even more rancorous odor in light of the changes in the democrat-
ic process sought to be implemented by Proposition 13. By its terms
Proposition 13 requires a two thirds majority of "all members elected
to each of the two houses of the Legislature" for the enactment of
"any changes in State taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing
revenues collected pursuant thereto whether by increased rates or
changes in methods of computation."78 This provision, read literally,
would seem to prohibit the use of the very mechanism that brought
Proposition 13 into existence, that is, the voter initiative,79 for future
changes in property taxation. However, the California Supreme Court
has ruled that the statutory initiative process was not overturned by
this language." Still it is clear that the supermajority requirement of
Proposition 13 was an effort to insulate it from future changes. The
77. Arguably, the California resident parents of those latecomers who were minors when
Proposition 13 was passed would have considered their children's interests. Those persons
who were California renters who planned to buy sometime in the future or who were Califor-
nia homeowners who planned to move within California also would have had some interest
in voting against Proposition 13. But these interests were more inchoate and contingent than
the immediate prospect of a 60% tax cut for all current homeowners coupled with an imme-
diate permanent tax freeze. The fact is that discrimination against a group that will only exist
in the future is inherently easier than discrimination against a presently constituted body of
people because none of the voters are presently standing in the shoes of the intended victim.
Doubtless, some of the California homeowners who voted for Proposition 13 subsequently
became its victims. But in the main, the voters could reasonably anticipate that someone else
would get stuck with the big tax bill if Proposition 13 passed.
78. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3. It also prohibits "[all] new ad valorem taxes on real
property, or sales or transaction taxes on the sales of real property." Id. For the full text of
this provision, see supra note 29.
79. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. In California, an initiative passes with a simple ma-
jority. See id. art. XVIII, § 4.
80. Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 806 P.2d 1360 (Cal. 1991).
In that case, the petitioners offered proof that the sponsors of Proposition 13 subscribed to
the interpretation of Proposition 13 that foreclosed future use of the initiative power to amend
it. See id. at 1363 n.2. But, the court ruled that an after-the-fact statement of intent was not
binding on its determination of "how the voters understood the ambiguous provisions." Id.
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existing homeowners were not only conferring a benefit upon them-
selves and a detriment upon others not fully represented, they were
attempting to change the rules of the game to ensure that the late-
comers would not change the rules when they arrived. The current
homeowners were drawing up the ladder.
Changes in the procedures of democracy may be effectuated in a
facially neutral manner and yet still cause us to suspect them." This
is certainly true when changes in that process intended to harden the
status quo are coupled with creation of a new status quo that discrim-
inates, as Proposition 13 does, against a group not fully represented
in the process. In such cases "more exacting judicial scrutiny" of the
discriminatory classification scheme is justified.
3. The Allegheny Decision
Although the Supreme Court has invalidated state taxing schemes
on equal protection grounds infrequently, two of those rare decisions
have come within the last decade. In 1985, in Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co. v. Ward, 2 the Court struck down an Alabama taxing
scheme that taxed out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than in-state insurance companies. In 1989, in Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. County Commission,"3 the Court ruled that the practice
of a West Virginia property tax assessor of assessing coal mining
property according to acquisition-cost violated the equal protection
rights of those taxpayers who were recent purchasers of coal property.
Of the two cases, the Allegheny decision is particularly striking
because of its close resemblance to Nordlinger." In Allegheny, the
Webster County assessor assessed recently acquired property at its
sale price while only minimally increasing the assessments of long-
held property. This resulted in great disparities in assessments be-
tween properties of similar value." This scheme of assessment was
used by the assessor despite the fact that West Virginia law required
that property be assessed according to its fair market value.86 In es-
sence, the West Virginia assessor had established a de facto acquisi-
tion-cost assessment scheme in contravention of West Virginia law.
81. See Brilmayer. supra note 66, at 1310-15.
82. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
83. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
84. As will be discussed infra parts III.C-D. Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens did not
believe that Allegheny properly could be distinguished from Nordlinger.
85. Allegheny. 488 U.S. at 341.
86. See W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
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However, the West Virginia Supreme Court had refused to overturn
the complaining taxpayers' assessments because those assessments
were not incorrect.' The appropriate remedy, the court opined, was
for the complainants to seek increased assessments for the underval-
ued properties.8"
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating that, "the fairness of
one's allocable share of the total property tax burden can only be
meaningfully evaluated by comparison with the share of others simi-
larly situated relative to their property holdings. The relative underval-
uation of comparable property in Webster County over time therefore
denies the petitioners equal protection of the law." 9 However, in
apparent anticipation of the obvious implications its decision might be
seen to have for Proposition 13, the Court took special note of the
Webster County assessor's divergence from the requirements of state
law.' It implied that a single assessor was not free to create classifi-
cations no matter how reasonable or unreasonable those classifications
might be. Instead the assessor was bound by the classification scheme
adopted by the state's legislature. The Court left open the question of
whether a legislatively adopted acquisition-cost assessment scheme
would survive equal protection scrutiny.9'
To a property tax aficionado, the Allegheny decision seems quite
unremarkable. After all, it merely reaffirmed what had been widely
understood as the fair and proper system for assessing property for
taxation. However, some constitutional scholars found the decision
unsettling. Professor Robert Glennon described the decision as having
"ominous" implications.' Professor William Cohen described the
outcome in Allegheny as "startling."93 Both recognized that Allegheny
87. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 342; see In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida Coal
Co., 360 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Coun-
ty Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
88. In re 1975 Tax Assessments, 360 S.E.2d at 565.
89. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 346.
90. Id. at 345.
91. Id. at 344 n.4. The Court's effort to explain its decision in Allegheny in a way that
distances that decision from Proposition 13 has been the object of commentary. See Glennon,
supra note 51, at 293-302. The Court's subsequent effort in Nordlinger to distinguish its
decision in Allegheny was a matter of some contention within the Court. Indeed, Justice
Thomas' concurrence in Nordlinger is largely devoted to arguing that Allegheny is indistin-
guishable and thus should be overruled. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2336-41
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). Conversely, Justice Stevens' dissent argues that Allegheny
requires the Court to invalidate Proposition 13. See id. at 2342-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Both the Thomas concurrence and the Stevens dissent are discussed infra parts III.C-D.
92. Glennon, supra note 51, at 262.
93. Cohen, A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh, supra note 51, at 89: see also John H.
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held implications for the validity of Proposition 13." Professor Co-
hen, especially, indicated a preference for not extending the Court's
decision in Allegheny to invalidate Proposition 13.' The basis for
this preference seems to be a conviction that the overturning of Prop-
osition 13 by the Court would require that the members of the Court
substitute their own of views of fairness for that of the citizens of
California. Thus, for example, in discussing Chief Justice Bird's dis-
sent in the case in which the California Supreme Court upheld Propo-
sition 13, Professor Cohen wrote that: "[h]er error was in insisting
that the United States Constitution required her to trump the Califor-
nia Constitution with her own conceptions of fairness."96 Though
Professor Cohen recognized that "issues of fairness are crucial to
equal protection analysis,"'  he asserted that "[t]he central point of
'rational basis' scrutiny, however, is that debatable propositions about
fairness are for legislatures."98 Professor Cohen's error, I will argue
infra, lies in perceiving the acquisition value assessment scheme as
Ely, Another Spi on Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. REv. 107 (1990); Barbara Paley,
Note, Federal Accountability for Local Tax Assessment Schemes-An Equal Protection Over-
lay: Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, West Virginia,
43 TAX LAw. 457 (1990); John Vitha, Comment, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commission of Webster County, West Virginia: The Supreme Court Gives "Welcome Strang-
er" Tax Assessments a Cold Reception, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1383 (1991).
94. Cohen, A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh, supra note 51, at 91, 97-99; Glennon,
supra note 51, at 293.
95. Cohen, A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh, supra note 51, at 99.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 98.
98. Id. at 99. Professor Glennon's concern about the Allegheny decision is more frankly
political. He fears the decision may portend an effort by the Court to stand as "wealth's
bulwark against income redistribution." Glennon. supra note 51, at 275. Professor Glennon's
concern, it seems to me, arises from too narrow a conception of how the Allegheny decision
might be used by others. Equal protection analysis can cut in favor of the less wealthy as
easily as for the wealthy. Indeed it seems to me that in the end it is the less wealthy who
would benefit most from a rigorous enforcement of equal protection standards. For an illustra-
tion, see Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1988) (holding unconstitutional, under a state
uniformity clause, a property tax statute that separately classified unmined coal from other
real property in order to largely exempt it from taxation). The Gillis decision represented a
significant victory for rural counties and school districts since unmined coal was a major
portion of their property tax bases. Though Glennon is cognizant of the two edged aspect of
Allegheny, he still asserts that "Allegheny surely serves conservative political ends." Glennon,
supra note 51, at 276. In my view there is nothing inherently political in the principle estab-
lished by Allegheny unless we view a requirement that like cases be treated alike as political
dogma. However, his instinct that the courts are more likely to use the equal protection ratio-
nale in favor of conservative political ends is supported by the failure to overturn Proposition
13 in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992). Nordlinger was clearly a victory for
established wealth.
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representing a supportable conception of fairness.99 I will argue that
there are recognized standards by which we gauge fairness in matters
of taxation and that Proposition 13 does not meet those standards.
But, even if some relatively objective standards of fairness apply
to Proposition 13, the application of those standards still requires
judgments that are inherently contextual. In order to judge whether a
rule is reasonable, we have to see the rule in operation."ro We need
to understand how important the rule is. Does it affect many people
or only a few? Does it alter the entire legal system in which it is
employed or only one small area of the system? To be rational, the
classification must forward a public good that outweighs the harm it
may cause those who are disadvantaged by the classification.'' To
judge this, one must see what the classification's effect is. This brings
us to a more direct consideration of Nordlinger v. Hahn.
I. THE CASE OF NORDLINGER V. HAHN
A. The Facts
Stephanie Nordlinger bought a home in November of 1988. It
was a small home in a neighborhood of tract homes in the Baldwin
Hills section of Los Angeles. She paid $170,000 for the home which
was assessed by the Los Angeles County Tax Assessor at $170,100
and her first full year property tax bill was $1,701." It was undis-
puted that her property tax bill was roughly five times greater than
the property tax bills received by those of her comparably housed
neighbors who had owned their homes since 1975."3 Nor was it
99. 1 recognize that, in this postmodern era, it may seem absurd to contend that such
things as generally accepted notions of fairness exist. Recent jurisprudential writing asserts the
improbability of "value consensus." Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, the Root
Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 371, 375 (1992). Nonetheless, I will argue that value consensus does exist in
the field of taxation sufficient to establish the unfairness of acquisition-cost assessment
schemes.
100. Farrell, focusing on legislative purpose, approaches this issue in this fashion, "[t]he
effects of a law are an important starting point in identifying its purpose." Farrell, supra note
51, at 33.
101. Id. at 45.
102. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2330. Under Proposition 13, real property is assessed at
the value of the property at the time it is acquired by the owner. Id. at 2329. Also, it will
be recalled that Proposition 13 capped property tax rates. The maximum rate is one percent
of assessed value. Id. Thus, one percent of $170,100 is $1,701.
103. Id. at 2330.
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disputed that "[tihe general tax levied against her modest home is
only a few dollars short of that paid by a pre-1976 owner of a $2.1
million Malibu beachfront home."" Additional evidence was intro-
duced at trial to show that other, even greater, tax burden disparities
existed in other parts of Los Angeles with respect not only to owner
occupied residential property but also with respect to apartment build-
ings and commercial and industrial income-producing properties."
In short, Proposition 13 had done just what it was designed to do,
shift the tax burden to more recent buyers of property.
I am certain this short synopsis of the facts cannot do justice to
Stephanie Nordlinger's story. Nor can it adequately picture the mil-
lions of other stories that have been played out under the rules set
down by Proposition 13."a But I hope it will be enough to forward
the reader's understanding of what follows.
B. The Law According to the Majority
1. The Argument the Court Declined to Hear
Stephanie Nordlinger argued that Proposition 13 should be sub-
ject to a higher level of scrutiny than is afforded by the rational basis
test because it violated her constitutional right to travel.0 7 This ar-
gument relied heavily on the Court's decision in Zobel v. Wil-
liams' where the Court struck down an Alaska oil revenue distri-
bution scheme that based the amount of one's distribution on length
of residency. However, the Nordlinger Court believed that the peti-
104. Id.
105. Id. at n.2.
106. I suspect that a fascinating article could be written about Proposition 13 utilizing a
legal storytelling approach. However, this is not that article. Legal storytelling addresses the
law from the perspective of individual narratives. From this perspective, each case is viewed
as important not for the rule that arises from it but because some person's life is bound up
in that case and its outcome. Moreover, legal storytelling need not be concerned with "for-
mal" cases at all. Legal storytelling is a form of "rebellion against abstraction." Toni M.
Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2099 (1989) (part of a legal storytelling symposium contained in pages 2073
through 2494 of volume 87). The rise of legal storytelling has recently been chronicled. See
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Nar-
ratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993) (arguing that while narratives can be useful in legal
scholarship, legal storytelling should also contain a significant analytical component). For a
response to Farber & Sherry, see Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to
Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993).
107. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 39-49, Nordlinger (No. 90-1912).
108. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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tioner lacked standing to raise the right to travel issue because she
had been a Los Angeles resident prior to the acquisition of her cur-
rent home."° My reason for mentioning the right to travel issue
here is to alert the reader to the possibility that the issue will be
revived. The Court's ruling on standing invites a further test of Prop-
osition 13 by a home buyer who has recently moved to California
from another state.
In rejecting Nordlinger's only argument for heightened scrutiny,
the Court laid the groundwork for using a low intensity rational basis
review. It did not address, nor was it asked to address, the procedural
and representation arguments for rationality review with "bite" set out
earlier in this Article.1
2. The Rational Basis Test
In describing the rational basis test in Nordlinger, Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority,"' set out the standard of review
in this fashion:
The appropriate standard of review is whether the difference in
treatment between newer and older owners rationally furthers a
legitimate state interest. In general, the Equal Protection Clause is
satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classi-
fication, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently
based rationally may have been considered to be true by the govern-
mental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its
goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
irrational."
2
To this general standard, the opinion then adds the gloss that "[t]his
standard is especially deferential in the context of classifications made
by complex tax laws. '[I]n structuring internal taxation schemes 'the
States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines
which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxa-
tion. ['''tt13
The opinion further suggests that the case simply raises an ordi-
nary classification question involving new owners and old owners.
109. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2332.
110. See supra part I.C.2.
111. The majority included all of the Justices except Justice Stevens. Justice Thomas
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Stevens' vigorous dissent is dis-
cussed infra part III.D.
112. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2332 (citations omitted).
113. Id. (citations omitted).
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This approach is interesting because typically questions of classifica-
tion in the context of property taxation relate to classification based
on the nature of the underlying property rather than on the nature of
its owner. Thus, for instance, legislatures commonly distinguish be-
tween real property and personal property for property tax purposes.
Typically, all residential real property is deemed to belong to the
same class. By looking to the owners as the subjects of classification
in Nordlinger, the Court is shifting attention away from the fact that
properties within the same class, for example, nearly identical residen-
tial properties resting side by side, are being treated differently from
one another. In addition, the opinion assumes that there is a classifi-
cation scheme at work here that divides people into two classes; new
owners and old owners. In reality, however, Proposition 13 divides
people into a myriad of classes. Every homeowner is in the same
class with those other homeowners who paid the same amount for
their homes, whatever those homes may be worth now." 4 Thus,
Stephanie Nordlinger is in the same class with the owner of the
Malibu mansion because her original cost was the same. The Court's
treatment of the classification scheme as creating two classes is but
one example of the artful way in which Justice Blackmun's opinion
seeks to fit the case into standard equal protection analysis while also
downplaying the discriminatory aspect of Proposition 13.
After framing the issue as a standard classification matter, Justice
Blackmun points out that:
As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does not dis-
criminate with respect to either the tax rate or the annual rate of
adjustment in assessments. Newer and older owners alike benefit in
both the short and long run from the protections of a 1% tax rate
ceiling and no more than a 2% increase in assessment value per
year. 
5
The importance of this feature of Proposition 13 to Justice Blackmun
and the other members of the majority is that it shows the general
benevolence of Proposition 13 as it helps everyone. Only in one
respect is the law discriminatory. "New owners and old owners are
treated differently with respect to one factor only-the basis on which
114. Another way to look at Proposition 13 is that it creates a new class of taxpayers
every day, i.e., each buyer is in a class with all other same-day buyers. The problem of
isolating a coherent classification scheme in Proposition 13 was pointed out to the Court in
the Petitioner's reply brief. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 5-7, Nordlinger (No. 90-1912).
115. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2332.
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their property is initially assessed."".6
Justice Blackmun seems to be implying that the amount of dis-
crimination involved is small because it involves only one factor. But,
of course, the factor involved is a vital factor in determining the
amount of one's tax liability-the tax base. Using different tax bases
for similarly situated taxpayers is as effective in altering the balance
in their respective tax liabilities as using different rates. The legal and
effective rate of tax paid by Ms. Nordlinger was one percent. The
legal rate paid by the owner of the $2.1 million dollar Malibu man-
sion referred to earlier was also one percent, but the effective rate, as
measured by fair market value, was less than one tenth of one per-
cent.
3. The Court's Reasoning and a Brief Critique
Now we have arrived at the crux of the matter. The taxing
scheme contains one clearly discriminatory element, the initial tax
base. Does that discriminatory element have a rational basis? The
Court thought it did on two grounds. The Court's first rationale stat-
ed:
[T]he State has a legitimate interest in local neighborhood preserva-
tion, continuity, and stability. The State therefore legitimately can
decide to structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover in
ownership of homes and businesses, for example, in order to inhibit
displacement of lower income families by the forces of gentrifica-
tion or of established, 'mom-and-pop' businesses by newer chain
operations. By permitting older owners to pay progressively less in
taxes than new owners of comparable property, the Article XIIIA
assessment scheme rationally furthers this interest."7
There is a legitimate aspect to this rationale, but the legitimate
aspect of the rationale does not justify the discriminatory aspect of
Proposition 13. As already mentioned, one of the inffirmities of the
property tax is its failure to necessarily coincide with the taxpayer's
ability to pay. In extreme cases precipitous rises in property taxes
may force some taxpayers to sell their property in order to pay the
taxes on the property. But this unhappy eventuality is largely avoid-
able without any discrimination against newer owners by capping the
revenue raising capacity of the property tax. One such system em-
ploys a "compensating tax rate" which declines as assessments in-
116. Id. at 2332-33.
117. Id. at 2333 (citations omitted).
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crease so that, in the aggregate, taxes do not increase beyond a speci-
fied percent per year."' This system has been employed in Ken-
tucky for many years."' A less theoretically sound approach would
be to freeze all assessments. 20 For example, in the context of Prop-
osition 13, property sold after 1976 could have been allowed to keep
its 1976 assessment. Even a home built after 1976 could have been
assessed at the value it would have had if it had existed in 1976.21
However, the compensating tax rate is a much superior approach
118. This can be readily illustrated: Suppose that last year the property tax rate was one
percent and aggregate assessments totalled $100 billion. Thus, last year's revenue yield was
$1 billion (.01 x 100,000,000,000 = 1,000.000,000). If aggregate assessments for the current
year equal $110 billion, the compensating tax rate necessary to maintain a revenue freeze
would be slightly more than nine-tenths of one percent (.0090909 x 110,000,000,000 =
1,000,000,000).
This sort of revenue freeze will not freeze every individual's tax liability because
some properties will outperform the market and some properties will appreciate less rapidly
than the market as a whole. But all property owners are insulated from tax increases arising
solely from generalized inflation. Even the person who owns a home that outperforms the
market is not likely to face a tax increase sufficient to endanger his or her economic well-
being. Indeed, that person is probably more than compensated for any tax increase by the
increased economic benefit of owning such valuable property.
The compensating tax rate in the property tax context is comparable to the approach
taken in the federal income tax of indexing tax brackets for inflation. See I.R.C. § l(f) (West
Supp. 1993). Although I believe that Ms. Nordlinger's case was presented reasonably forceful-
ly, I was struck by the failure of any of the seventeen briefs filed by the parties and amici
to mention the availability of a compensating tax rate as a nondiscriminatory mechanism to
control tax increases fueled by inflation. It is possible that the Court would have been less
lenient in its view of Proposition 13 if it had been better informed on the availability of
non-discriminatory tax freezes to the people of California.
119. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.010(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991). Utah has a
similar system. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-2-918 to -924 (1992). For a brief description of
Utah's system, see Gary R. Thorup, Nordlinger and Friends, Issues and Acquisitions, 3 ST.
TAX NOTs 864, 865 (1992).
120. Nordlinger's brief makes this argument. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 36,
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (No. 90-1912). However, as the Governor's
amicus brief points out, such a system would create its own inequities. See Brief of Gover-
nor Pete Wilson et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23, Nordlinger (No.
90-1912). This would occur because, over time, as properties appreciated at different rates,
horizontal equity would dissipate. However, to the extent that inflation was generalized, a
general assessment freeze would maintain rough equality while insulating homeowners from
tax increases.
121. This would involve sort of a reverse appraisal. For instance, the appraiser would
have to take a home built in 1980 and answer the question: what would this house have
been appraised at in 1976? Clearly, this involves a legal fiction, i.e., the pretense that a
home built in 1980 was actually in existence in 1976. But legal fictions are commonplace in
tax law, and are legitimate means of making the law function fairly. See generally John A.
Miller, Liars Should Have Good Memories: Legal Fictions and the Tax Code, 64 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1 (1993).
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because of its ability to maintain assessment equality as values change
at different rates while also capping individual tax liabilities to the
extent of inflation.
The simple fact is that the Court could not justify the discrimina-
tory aspect of Proposition 13 by merely contending that the state has
a legitimate interest in preventing people from being forced to move
by higher property taxes fueled by inflation. To justify the discrimnina-
tory aspect of Proposition 13 the Court was forced to contend that
the state has a legitimate interest in using the property tax to actively
discourage people from moving. This, it seems to me, is plainly
wrong. What reason does the state have for wanting to force people
to stay in their homes when they genuinely wish to leave? More
likely, the state has an interest in enhancing the mobility of people
who wish or need to move. Indeed in the income tax law, the federal
government, California and most other states have explicitly agreed to
ease the tax burden of moving by allowing gain non-recognition on
the sales of homes and by making moving expenses deductible."
As a simple matter of reason, it is socially desirable to allow people
the freedom to move in order to be closer to their jobs or in order to
obtain better jobs. But Proposition 13 establishes a disincentive to
move because when the taxpayer buys a new home, the old low
assessment is replaced by a new high assessment even if the new
home is worth no more than the old home. The Court's justification
for this disincentive seems pathetically thin once it is divorced from
its reliance on the freeze component of Proposition 13.
The Court, again displaying an artful use of language, describes
Proposition 13 as "permitting older owners to pay progressively less
in taxes than new owners."'" This use of the concept of
progressivity is ironic when one considers the fact that Proposition 13
is likely to render the property tax an extremely regressive tax.' 4
122. See I.R.C. §§ 217, 1034 (1988); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 18031, 18044 ('West
1983); James Charles Smith & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Federally Deferred In-
come: The Interstate Dimension, 44 TAX. L. REV. 349, 349 (1989). Smith & Hellerstein
write:
Most states that impose income taxes conform their levies to the federal model.
Consequently, when income is realized but not recognized at the federal level-for
example, when a taxpayer reinvests the gain from the sale of her former residence
in a new residence . . . -states typically follow the federal rule in deferring rec-
ognition of that income.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
123. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2333 (emphasis added).
124. The terms progressive and regressive have several meanings depending on the con-
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This regressivity was illustrated by the fact that Stephanie Nordlinger
was paying as much in property taxes on her small tract home as the
owner of a Malibu mansion was paying on his home."as Is that ra-
tional?
As already noted the chief analytic failure of the Court's opinion
is its effort to justify the discriminatory component of Proposition 13
by reference to benefits arising from its tax freeze component without
recognizing that the two components are severable. But the Court's
justification of Proposition 13 is also flawed by a certain tunnel vi-
sion. That is, it focuses on protection of a small segment of the real
property owning population, lower-income families and "mom-and-
pop" businesses as justification for a property tax system that is de-
signed chiefly to benefit the middle and upper classes." 6 Can we
really argue with conviction that every millionaire homeowner resid-
ing in the state of California in 1978 was entitled to a permanent tax
advantage over subsequent home buyers in order to protect lower
income families from gentrification of their neighborhoods? Ultimately
text in which they are employed. In its usual sense, a progressive tax is one in which the
rate of tax climbs as the tax base increases. The primary tax where this concept is utilized is
the income tax. See Mark S. Stein, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income and Progressive
Taxation: A Critique of The Uneasy Case, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 373, 373-74 (1992). The
current federal income tax employs five rates for individuals: 15%, 28%, 31%, 36% and
39.6%. For married taxpayers filing jointly, these rates kick in at taxable income levels of
$1.00, $32,450, $78,400, $140,000, and $250,000 respectively. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (West Supp.
1993). Other provisions may slightly alter the effects of section l(a). See I.R.C. § I(f), (h)
(West Supp. 1993). Thus, a progressive income tax levies a higher rate of tax at higher
income levels. Property taxes and consumption taxes are more typically "flat" or proportional
taxes because only one rate is applied to the entire tax base. However, both property taxes
and consumption taxes can be rendered at least somewhat progressive by means of exemp-
tions and exclusions.
125. It will be recalled that Ms. Nordlinger paid $1,701 in taxes, representing one per-
cent of her home's $170,100 assessed value. The Malibu mansion owner also paid $1,700 in
property taxes, but on a home worth $2.1 million. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2330. The effec-
tive tax rate for the mansion owner was less than one tenth of one percent. Id.
Even this example may understate the regressiveness inherent in Proposition 13 be-
cause it does not consider the role of debt in assessing taxes. If.Ms. Nordlinger's home was
subject to a large mortgage while the Malibu mansion was owned free and clear, the regres-
siveness of the property tax as a tax on wealth is intensified. As a matter of logic, the lon-
ger a home has been owned by the same person, the greater the likelihood that it will not
be subject to a mortgage or that the mortgage balance will be relatively small. As any home-
owner knows, typically mortgages run for terms of either 15 years or 30 years. Proposition
13 was enacted approximately 15 years ago. Of course, the failure of the property tax to
function fairly as a tax on wealth is not entirely the fault of Proposition 13. See supra part
II.A.2. But that failing is magnified by Proposition 13.
126. As discussed later, Justice Stevens made this point in his dissent. See infra part
III.D.
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the Court's reasoning rings false. It is an argument made up for lack
of anything better to say. It is a rationalization. The State has no
legitimate interest in making its citizens prisoners in their own homes.
The Court's second rationalization in support of the discriminato-
ry element of Proposition 13 is significantly more doubtful than the
first. Justice Blackmun wrote:
Second, the State legitimately can conclude that a new owner
at the time of acquiring his property does not have the same reli-
ance interest warranting protection against higher taxes as does an
existing owner. The State may deny a new owner at the point of
purchase the right to "lock in" to the same assessed value as is
enjoyed by an existing owner of comparable property, because an
existing owner rationally may be thought to have vested expecta-
tions in his property or home that are more deserving of protection
than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at the point of
purchase. A new owner has full information about the scope of
future tax liability before acquiring the property, and if he thinks
the future tax burden is too demanding, he can decide not to com-
plete the purchase at all. By contrast, the existing owner, already
saddled with his purchase, does not have the option of deciding not
to buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high. To meet his tax
obligations, he might be forced to sell his home or to divert his
income away from the purchase of food, clothing, and other necessi-
ties. In short, the State may decide that it is worse to have owned
and lost, than never to have owned at all.
Note that in its second rationale the Court has again raised the
ability to pay issue already acknowledged as a problem with all prop-
erty taxes. Allow me to repeat that the ability to pay problem can be
solved with a compensating tax rate that declines as assessments
increase. There is no need to discriminate between newer and older
buyers in order to solve the ability to pay problem.' But what else
127. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2333.
128. Nordlinger argued that Proposition 13 has no significant connection to ability to pay
because what one can pay for a home at one point in time has no necessary relation with
one's income level at a later time. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 32, Nordlinger
(No. 90-1912).
Rather than being based on ability to pay, by its design Article XIIIA systematical-
ly ignores that critical factor. Long-time owners of the most luxurious mansions in
the wealthiest neighborhoods have become so advantaged by Article XIIIA that
they now pay lower taxes than recent buyers of humble bungalows in the poorest




is the Court saying? In part it seems to be contending that a taxpayer
has a "reliance interest" in the property tax system that entitles her to
expect that her taxes will not increase. I confess I have never heard
of such a reliance interest before. Moreover, the Court's contention
that such a reliance interest exists seems to contradict reality. Do
those persons first employed in 1987 have a right to insist that their
income can never be taxed at a higher marginal rate than twenty-eight
per cent, the top marginal rate for that year? Of course not. A tax-
payer has no right to insist that the taxing scheme in effect on his
date of birth or on some other date is the only one that may apply to
him throughout his life. Tax laws change; sometimes the changes are
even retroactive. The mere fact of change in the law by itself never
entitles the taxpayer to object to the law.
It is important to recognize that multiple tax bases like those
employed by Proposition 13 are no different in effect than multiple
tax rates. Suppose that California had enacted a property tax rate-
scheme that utilized market value assessments but provided that rates
would increase by one per cent each year but only for buyers during
the year in question. Thus, for example, in 1978 the tax rate might
have been one percent, but for those persons who purchased their
homes in 1979 the rate would be two percent. Those persons who
purchased their homes in 1980 would pay at a rate of three percent.
This could go on year after year. The effects of such a system would
resemble the effects of Proposition 13 with the difference being that
the newcomers pay more in taxes than their comparably housed
neighbors because of differences in rates rather than because of differ-
ences in bases. In short, the discriminatory approach is more forth-
right, but there is no logical difference in the outcome or in the justi-
fications that might be offered for the outcome. Just like the
Nordlinger majority, we might justify such a scheme on the basis of
reliance interest analysis. The people who bought in 1978 relied on
having a one percent tax rate. Those persons who bought in 1990
knew in advance that they would pay a twelve percent property tax.
They could judge whether or not they could afford it.
But is such reasoning satisfactory? To me it rings hollow and
cold. It is the reasoning of the smug, the self-satisfied, the well
off.'29 We can understand this better if we reduce the level of ab-
129. In this sense it is typical of some so-called "neutral" jurisprudence, that is, it is
laden with hidden bias favoring the established over the disadvantaged. For a recent interest-
ing treatment of this problem see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality
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straction by considering who is hurt by such a scheme. The short
answer is that those persons who do not currently own homes (but
who hope to) are those most harmed by such a system. Included in
this group are young people, people in transition, the working
poor,'30 and, perhaps, racial minorities. I include racial minorities as
probable victims of Proposition 13 because historically people of
color have had less success than their white economic counterparts in
obtaining the financing necessary to purchase homes.13' But there is
some evidence that this form of discrimination is declining.33 Thus,
if blacks in California ultimately succeed in becoming homeowners in
a percentage equalling the white percentage of home ownership, it
will be in spite of Proposition 13. Moreover, black homeowners will
bear a comparatively greater tax burden than their white counterparts
who were able to purchase homes earlier because they did not have
to overcome the barrier of racial discrimination.
33
Just as it is worthwhile to consider who is harmed by Proposi-
tion 13 it is worthwhile to consider who is helped by it. The answer,
of course, is the existing homeowners." This group is certain to
include nearly all wealthy and upper middle class persons of a mature
age. 3 It will also include a large portion of the mature middle
and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1993).
130. The Court grudgingly grants this point late in its opinion but then excuses itself
from intervening by reference to the need to allow the democratic process to run its course:
Petitioner and amici argue with some appeal that Article XIIIA frustrates
the "American Dream" of home ownership for many younger and poorer California
families ...
Time and again, however, this Court has made clear in the rational basis
context that the "Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy,
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process
and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we
may think a political branch has acted."
Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2335-36 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
131. For an enlightening description of the difficulties blacks have traditionally faced in
obtaining mortgages see Paulette Thomas, Blacks Can Face a Host of Trying Conditions in
Getting Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at Al, A8-A9.
132. Id. at A9.
133. It is worth noting that while 66% percent of whites surveyed favored Proposition 13
at the time of its enactment, only 18% of blacks were in favor of it. Citrin & Levy, supra
note 34, at 9. Clearly, most blacks perceived Proposition 13 to be against their self-interest.
134. Not only do these homeowners pay property taxes at lower effective rates, it has
been argued that Proposition 13 also enhanced the value of their homes. See Sexton et al.,
supra note 39, at 96.
135. It is worth noting that Sears & Citrin found that the strongest supporters of Proposi-
tion 13 were "white, middle-aged, higher-income men, especially those from Southern Califor-
nia." SEARS & CrrIN, supra note 30, at 220.
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class.'36 As mentioned earlier Proposition 13 was a "revolt of the
haves."'37 Moreover, it is worthy of our understanding to see that
among the class of existing homeowners, Proposition 13 discriminates
more heavily in favor of those who grow wealthier fastest. Two sim-
ple examples will illustrate this point.
First, suppose two California taxpayers, Ron Reaganomics and
Sylvia Smalltown, purchase homes for the same amount in the same
year. Ron pays $1 million and Sylvia pays $1 million. In their first
year of ownership they each pay property tax in California at legal
and effective tax rates of one percent. Ron, thus, pays ten thousand
dollars in property tax and Sylvia pays ten thousand dollars in proper-
ty tax. Suppose that five years later Ron's home has tripled in value
while Sylvia's home has doubled in value. From a market value
perspective, Ron's home, still assessed at acquisition cost, is underas-
sessed by $2 million while Sylvia's home is underassessed by $1
million. Ron has $1 million more of wealth escaping taxation as
compared to Sylvia. Thus, even as between persons nominally of the
same class, Proposition 13 discriminates in favor of the wealthier
person.
In our second illustration, let's assume that Ron buys a home for
$1 million and Sylvia buys a home for one hundred thousand dollars.
Even if we assume that both homes appreciate at the same rate, Ron
will derive more benefit from Proposition 13 than will Sylvia. For
example, if both of their homes double in value, Sylvia will have one
hundred thousand dollars of wealth escaping taxation while Ron will
have $1 million of wealth escaping taxation. From a market value
perspective, Ron has nine hundred thousand dollars more wealth
escaping taxation than does Sylvia.
The conclusion is nearly inescapable that Proposition 13 has a
disparate impact based on age, mobility,' social class and probably
136. The Court grants this assertion but then offers the defense that this in itself is not
grounds for overturning Proposition 13. The Court states:
Certainly, California's grand experiment appears to vest benefits in a broad, power-
ful, and entrenched segment of society, and. as the Court of Appeal surmised,
ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to prompt its reconsideration or
repeal. Yet many wise and well-intentioned laws suffer from the same malady.
Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline petitioner's request to
upset the will of the people of California.
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (1992) (citations omitted).
137. SEARS & CtTRIN, supra note 30, at 220.
138. Sexton notes that persons who move frequently are hurt most by Proposition 13.
Sexton et al., supra note 39, at 96.
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on race as well. The class-based discrimination is particularly promi-
nent because of the existence of the rules allowing parents to pass
their low property tax assessments along with the family residence on
to their children. Moreover, it stands to reason that the offspring of
the wealthy will be able to buy homes at younger ages than the off-
spring of the poor because of parental gifts and loans and because of
the other economic and educational advantages that flow from an
affluent upbringing. Proposition 13 is a taxing scheme that will al-
ways favor, as a class, wealthier individuals over the less wealthy.
Can the neighborhood stability and reliance interest analysis of Justice
Blackmun really justify such discrimination? I do not believe that it
can, but I will save the rest of my argument until the other opinions
of the Court have been described.
C. Justice Thomas' Concurrence
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's conclusion that Propo-
sition 13 was rationally based but argued that this result could not be
squared with the Court's decision in Allegheny.'39 In his view Alle-
gheny should be overruled."4 He reasoned that the major distinction
between Nordlinger and Allegheny was that California's acquisition
value assessment scheme was based on state law while the West
Virginia assessor's acquisition value assessment scheme conflicted
with state law.141 This distinction, he argued, could not justify dif-
ferent outcomes in the two cases because a violation of state law
does not establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'42 On
this last point Justice Thomas echoed the views of several expert
commentators."
Though the view proffered by Justice Thomas may have some
merit, for present purposes it is only necessary to recognize that
Justice Thomas' opinion adds nothing to the debate concerning the
rationality of an acquisition-cost assessment scheme.'" His focus
139. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2336 (Thomas, J., concurring).
140. See id. at 2341.
141. Id. at 2339-40.
142. Id. at 2340 (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 (1944)).
143. Id. at 2340-41. Justice Thomas cites Professors Glennon, Cohen, and Ely on this
point. See Cohen, A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh, supra note 51, at 93-94; Ely, supra
note 93, at 108-09; Glennon, supra note 51, at 268-69.
144. One might be tempted to chastise Justice Thomas for his insensitivity to the class
and race discrimination issues inherent in Proposition 13. After all, he is a man of color who
grew up in poverty. Some might well contend that he has a special obligation to serve the
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was on another aspect of the case, and it will not be pursued here
any further.
D. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens began his dissent by taking note of the phenome-
nal appreciation in California real estate during the 1970s and 1980s
and by describing the phenomenal disparities in tax liabilities this
appreciation has wrought in conjunction with Proposition 13.145
Properties appreciated tenfold in value in a decade.'46 Consequently,
some persons pay ten times as much in property taxes as comparably
housed neighbors because of different purchase dates. In Stephanie
Nordlinger's case, she paid almost five times as much in property
taxes as her tract home neighbors.47 The early purchasers of Cali-
fornia real estate are referred to by Justice Stevens as "the Squires"
as a way of emphasizing their preferential status under Proposition
13.148 This medieval sobriquet is particularly appropriate because of
the rules allowing the transfer of the low property tax assessment
from parent to child for generation after generation.
Like Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens found Nordlinger indistin-
guishable from Allegheny.' But unlike Justice Thomas, he conclud-
ed from this that Proposition 13 could not withstand Equal Protection
analysis. In fact, in Justice Stevens' view "[i]f anything, the inequality
created by Proposition 13 is constitutionally more problematic because
it is the product of state-wide policy rather than the result of an
individual assessor's mal-administration."'5
Justice Stevens took the view that Proposition 13 was "palpably
interests of the poor and of racial minorities. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open
Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1005 (1992). However, it is my conviction that Justice Thomas's obligation to the poor and
oppressed is no greater or less than that of any other Supreme Court Justice. That is not to
say that his obligation is a small one. But, in my view, placing a greater burden on Justice
Thomas in such matters is a way of excusing the lack of empathy of the other Justices. We
should not excuse or forgive an upper class, white male Supreme Court Justice for his insen-
sitivity to the interests of those who differ from him in race or social class. His insensitivity
is a failing, not simply a biologic or social fact. If Justice Thomas has displayed an insensi-
tivity to the plight of the poor and oppressed, so has Justice Blackmun.
145. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2341 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Id. In 1989, while Nordlinger's neighbors paid an average of less than $400 in
taxes, Nordlinger paid $1,700. Id.
148. Id.
149. hI. at 2343.
150. Id.
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arbitrary" since acquisition value classification rests on nothing more
than a number that may now have no relevance to any reasonable
scheme of taxation.' He wrote:
Under Proposition 13, a majestic estate purchased for $150,000 in
1975 (and now worth more than $2 million) is placed in the same
tax class as a humble cottage purchased today for $150,000. The
only feature those two properties have in common is that some-
where, sometime a sale contract for each was executed that con-
tained the price "$150,000. '52
He argued that a classification scheme must have a rational basis
independent of merely advancing the interests of a favored class of
persons. Quoting Williams v. Vermont,"'53 he wrote "[t]he classifica-
tion must reflect pre-existing differences; it cannot create new ones
that are supported by only their own bootstraps."'' He then argued
that the reasons offered by the majority for acquisition value classifi-
cation were too far removed from those whom the majority claimed it
was intended to benefit. "Proposition 13 sweeps too broadly and
operates too indiscriminately to 'rationally further' the State's interest
in neighborhood preservation."'55 The fact that some persons within
the favored group might need protection from tax increases simply
could not justify a "state-wide, across-the-board tax windfall for all
property owners and their descendants." 5'
Justice Stevens flatly denied the majority's argument that earlier
landowners had a reliance interest in lower assessments. In fact, he
asserted that prior to the enactment of Proposition 13 many purchas-
ers must have hoped that their property would appreciate in value
even though they knew that their assessments would rise according-
ly.' 7 He noted that, in a sense, Proposition 13 created a reliance
interest in a fixed and low assessment. But, he argued, this could not
justify its enactment since it "simply restates the effects of Proposi-
tion 13."' 5 As for the point made by the majority that later pur-
chasers know in advance that they will bear a greater tax burden than
earlier purchasers, Justice Stevens asserted that this "does not answer
151. Id. at 2344.
152. Id.
153. 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985) (citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308 (1966)).
154. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2344.
155. Id. at 2345.
156. Id.
157. id. at 2346.
158. Id. at 2347.
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the critical question: Is it reasonable and constitutional to tax early
purchasers less than late purchasers when at the time of taxation their
properties are comparable?"'59 In his own view:
[I]t is irrational to treat similarly situated persons differently on the
basis of the date they joined the class of property owners. Until
today, I would have thought this proposition far from controver-
sial .... Similarly situated neighbors have an equal right to share
in the benefits of local government. It would obviously be unconsti-
tutional to provide one with more or better fire or police protection
than the other; it is just as plainly unconstitutional to require one to
pay five times as much in property taxes as the other for the same
government services."
Unlike the rather mechanical opinions of Justice Blackmun and
Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens focuses his arguments upon the con-
cept of fairness. He asks: how can we justify such strikingly unequal
treatment of similarly situated persons?; how can we justify such
favored treatment for people based on a number that appeared in a
contract more than fifteen years ago? Stevens' questions go unan-
swered by the majority because there is no truly persuasive an-
swer. 6 ' In the end we are left with Professor Cohen's assertion that
debatable questions of fairness should be left to the legislature rather
than to the courts, and that the unfairness of Proposition 13 is a
debatable matter." To his credit, Professor Cohen sees Proposition
13 as creating "considerable unfairness."'" But, apparently, he sees
his own judgment in the matter as an insufficient basis for belief in
the unconstitutionality of Proposition 13.' 4 It is time to consider
whether Professor Cohen's modesty is well founded.
IV. IS INJUSTICE RATIONAL?
"The duty to pay taxes, or the power to tax, is among the most
tangible of all links between subject and sovereign, or citizen and
society."'65 Considering the importance that this "most tangible of
all links" has for both the citizen and for society, it should surprise
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2347-48.
161. See id. at 2347.
162. Cohen, A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh, supra note 51, at 98-99.
163. Id. at 99.
164. Id. at 97-99.
165. MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 61.
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no one to learn that all modem taxing schemes, including the proper-
ty tax, have some moral or ethical basis. It is only natural that when
people are forced to part with their hard earned wealth through the
payment of taxes that they should want to know that their fellow
citizens are bearing their fair share of the total burden. In this coun-
try, "[t]he struggle to overcome arbitrariness in taxation was one of
the early objectives of constitutional government."' 6 Arbitrariness
can -only be overcome by finding measures for individual tax liability
that are widely regarded as fair.
A. How Do We Measure Tax Justice?
"Perhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation
is that people in equal positions should be treated equally."'67 In the
argot of tax people, this is what is called "horizontal equity."'63 It
166. Id.
167. Id. at 160; see also HENRY C. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 8 (1950); Michael J.
Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision. 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 47, 79 (1977); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case For
Random Taxation, 18 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 1-2 (1982). More than two hundred years ago Adam
Smith put it this way: "The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support
of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state."
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
777 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937). There are subtleties in Smith's view of horizontal equity such
as his apparent endorsement of an income tax as the fairest tax. But I will not explore these
issues here because this Article assumes the existence of a property tax system. The issue is
not whether a property tax is the most rational tax we could have, but rather what is a
rational property tax? One answer to this question is that in our society a rational property
tax must provide equal treatment to persons in like circumstances.
Of course the principle of treating like cases alike has a long history outside of and
prior to its development in the law of taxation. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Moral Foun-
dations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427,
441-447 (1993). "The equality ideal has been a profoundly important ethic in moral and
political philosophy throughout the ages. It was perhaps the central ethic in Aristotle's theory
of corrective justice." Id. at 441 nA1; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality:
A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH, L. REV. 575, 575 (1983) ("No value is more thor-
oughly entrenched in Western culture than is the notion of equality.").
168. Another way of stating this principle is "[p]olicies that redistribute should levy iden-
tical taxes or provide identical transfers to all units with the same level of well-being." Rob-
ert Plotnick, A Comparison of Measures of Horizontal Inequity, in HORIZONTAL EQUITY,
UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 239, 239 (Martin David & Timothy Smeeding
eds.. 1985). In the discussion that follows I make no attempt to describe the different nuanc-
es that have been ascribed to the term "horizontal equity." The economics literature, in partic-
ular, is laden with intricate descriptions of how we might seek to define and measure hori-
zontal equity. See, e.g., A.B. Atkinson, Horizontal Equity and the Distribution of the Tax
Burden, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 3 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds.,
1980). There are also different ethical bases on which to justify horizontal equity as a tax
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has been said that "[elquity in this primary sense must, in an ad-
vanced nation, predominate over, if not wholly override, all other
objectives."' 69  A dozen years ago Princeton economist Joseph
Stiglitz wrote, "so basic is the notion of horizontal equity that it is
incorporated in the Constitution of the United States in the '[E]qual
[P]rotection [C]lause.""" Former Harvard economist Richard
Musgrave has made a similar allusion."' In the present context, this
assumed connection between horizontal equity and equal protection
takes on an irony that neither Stiglitz nor Musgrave could have in-
tended. As will be described more fully, the essence of Proposition
13 was the abandonment of horizontal equity in property taxation,
and, the essence of the Supreme Court's decision in Nordlinger"
was to hold that the Equal Protection Clause sanctions that abandon-
ment.
A corollary principle to the principle of treating like cases alike
is the principle that people in different positions should be treated
differently.' In tax jargon this second principle of tax justice is
known as "vertical equity." To give the terms horizontal equity and
vertical equity concrete meaning requires "an objective index of
equality."'74 Since equality in the taxation context is fundamentally
an economic concept, the accepted indices of equality are economic
in nature. Depending on the form of tax in question, the possible
indices of equality may be income, consumption or wealth. In the
property tax context the generally accepted index is wealth. As will
be discussed infra, other views of the property tax are possible. How-
ever, the traditional view is that horizontal equity is present in the
property tax if persons with property of equal value pay equal taxes.
Vertical equity is at least partially satisfied when owners of property
of greater value pay more in taxes than the owners of property of
lesser value.
In the context of the Nordlinger case, the denigration of horizon-
principle. Id. Economists also debate whether it is an independent principle or whether it
derives from other concepts such as vertical equity. Id. at 13; see also MUSGRAVE, supra
note 1, at 160. Although I focus my attention on horizontal equity, I might have easily fo-
cused on vertical equity. For most purposes they are but two sides of the same coin. See id.
169. SIMONS, supra note 167, at 11.
170. Stiglitz, supra note 167, at 1.
171. Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 113
(1990).
172. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
173. MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 160; SIMONS, supra note 167, at 8.
174. MUSGRAVE, supra note I, at 161.
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tal equity implicit in Proposition 13 is embodied in the fact that Ms.
Nordlinger was obliged to pay five times as much in property taxes
as her similarly housed neighbors. 75 The denial of vertical equity is
similarly evidenced by the fact that Ms. Nordlinger was obliged to
pay the same amount of property taxes as the owner of a Malibu
mansion.76 However, vertical equity is usually thought to include an
element of progressiveness.' The traditional property tax makes lit-
tle attempt to be progressive, "that is, the tax as a percentage of the
incomes of those who bear the ultimate burden" does not rise as
income rises.' Instead, it is structured as a proportionate or "flat"
tax, and its actual incidence is quite regressive in that effective rates
decline significantly in relation to income. 79 In the end, whatever
tax justice that can be found in the property tax depends primarily on
the existence of horizontal equity, but this implies the presence of
some degree "of vertical equity as well.
B. Three Economic Bases for the Property Tax
The property tax has been regarded as "having the virtues of
being the simplest and most visible of the inherently just taxes."'t0
This is an exaggeration,' but the "inherent justice" of the tax, to
the extent it exists, arises out of the three possible economic bases
mentioned above. Thus, we may conceive of the tax as being fair
because ideally its burden falls in proportion to one's wealth as mea-
sured by the fair market value of one's property.' A second basis
for considering the property tax a just tax is that it may also be
175. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2330.
176. Id.
177. See SIMIONS, supra note 167, at 8.
178. NETZER, supra note 8, at 5.
179. Netzer concluded that ultimately the property tax on housing was "markedly regres-
sive when compared to money income before taxes." Id. at 46. He offers analysis from 1960
income tax returns to show that the property taxes as a percentage of income declined from
about six percent to about two percent as annual income rose from less than two thousand
dollars to over fifteen thousand dollars. Id. at 50.
180. Robert C. Denne, Introduction to ANALYZING ASSESSMENT EQUITY 21 (Int'l Ass'n
of Assessing Officers ed., 1977).
181. As discussed supra part II.A, the property tax is flawed in both theory and practice.
The narrowness of the modem property tax base, focusing, as it does, on real property, ren-
ders it significantly less fair than a broader based tax.
182. As early as the seventeenth century it was argued that one's obligation to pay taxes
should be measured by one's wealth. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 66. "[I]t is generally
allowed by all that men should contribute to the public charge but according to the share
and interest they have in the public peace; that is, according to their estates and riches." Id.
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viewed as an indirect tax falling in proportion to one's income from
property. A final basis for considering the property tax a just tax is
that it may be seen as an excise tax in proportion to one's consump-
tion of property. The view of the property tax as a tax on wealth is
the traditional understanding of its nature. That is why the term "ad
valorem tax" is often used as a synonym for "property tax." Ad valo-
rem means "according to value."' The views of the property tax as
a form of income tax or as a tax on consumption are less obvious
and require some explanation.
The idea of the property tax as an indirect tax upon income
from property rests upon the view that one who owns property has
income equal to the fair rental value of the property. Of course, if the
property is not rented to a third party, this income is not reflected by
an actual receipt of money or property. Instead, it arises from the
absence of an expenditure for rent by the owner. An owner who
occupies her property has income from the use of property because
she is not required to pay rent. This is analogous to the employee
whose employer provides him with housing without charging any
rent. The employee is viewed as having compensation income equal
to the fair rental value of the housing provided." By the same log-
ic, one who owns her own home may be seen as having "imputed"
income equal to the fair rental value of the home because she rented
her home to herself rather than to someone else."85 Normally, imput-
ed income is not directly taxed as income.186 But the property tax
can be seen as an indirect tax upon both imputed and actual income
183. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990).
184. See, e.g., Dean v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951). But cf I.R.C.
§ 119(a) (1988) (creating a narrow exception for housing provided for the convenience of the
employer).
185. For more detailed discussions of imputed income, see MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAxAION: A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CON-
CEPTS 1 1.03 (6th ed. 1991); JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX 151-52, 225-27, 312-
15, 327 (1989); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 124-33 (8th ed.
1990). An important early work in this area is Donald B. Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed
Income, 58 POL. SCh Q. 514 (1943). Marsh begins his article with this definition:
Imputed income may be defined provisionally as a flow of satisfactions
from durable goods owned and used by the taxpayer, or from goods and services
arising out of the personal exertions of the taxpayer on his own behalf.
Imputed income is . . . a species of the genus income in kind, and its dis-
tinguishing characteristic is that it arises outside the ordinary processes of the mar-
ket.
Id.
186. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 185, at 124-33.
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from property.
The property tax is only an indirect tax on income because the
traditional property tax base is the sale value of the property rather
than the annual rental value of the property. But, in general, we can
say that there is a rational relationship between the fair market value
and the fair rental value of property."t 7 Indeed, the primary method
for valuing income-producing real estate is to multiply net income by
a capitalization rate."' Another income-based approach to valuation
of commercial property is to discount the property's anticipated future
income to its present value.189 Under both forms of valuation, the
greater the income a piece of property will produce, the greater its
fair market value. In short, value is proportionate to income. These
valuation approaches could be applied to residential property, but their
applications are not necessary because typically one can arrive at an
estimate of a home's value by direct comparisons to sales prices of
similar homes in the same neighborhood. The point is that the rental
value of property and its sale value have a reasonably well-defined
proportionate connection."9 Thus, a property tax measured by refer-
ence to sale value can be seen as a surrogate mechanism for taxing
both actual or imputed income from the property.
The view of the property tax as a tax on consumption has a
similar logic. The owner of property has the use of that property."'
The use of property is a form of consumption. The value of that
consumption, like the income from the property, is measured by the
fair rental value of the property. As discussed above, there is a pro-
portionate economic connection between fair rental value and fair
market value. Thus, the property tax can be viewed as a surrogate
mechanism for taxing consumption.
One of the benefits of viewing the property tax either as an
indirect tax on income from property or as a tax on consumption is
187. "A tax on capital is the same as a tax on capital income, if it applies to income-
earning assets only, and if such assets are valued by capitalizing the income stream."
MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 325.
188. See Leon W. Ellwood. Appraisal for Mortgage Loan Purposes, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
REAL ESTATE APPRAISING 1095 (3d ed. 1978), reprinted in MICHAEL T. MADISON & ROBERT
M. ZINMAN, MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 383, 383-84
(1991).
189. See Charles C. Wetterer, What is "Value?", 3 REAL EST. FIN. 77, 78 (1976), re-
printed in MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 188, at 387.
190. The rule of thumb is that property is worth about ten times its annual rental value.
Allen D. Manvel, Upside-Down Housing 'Aid'?, 53 TAX NOTES 743, 744-45 (1991).
191. This is so even if the owner chooses to rent the property to another.
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that it reveals the fallacy of one of the criticisms leveled against the
market value assessment scheme, that is, that it taxes unrealized or
paper gains.' When we see that one who owns a home has income
relative to one who rents an identical home, we also see that as home
values rise (and rents rise with them), the homeowner enjoys a com-
parable rise in income and consumption. In short, as the cost of rent-
ing increases, the economic benefit of home ownership increases
also.' This benefit is realized immediately not merely on sale of
the residence.
C. The Connection Between Equity and
Accurate Assessments of Value
Whether we regard the property tax as a tax on wealth, income
or consumption, the horizontal equity of the property tax depends
upon accurate assessments of the value of the property subject to the
tax. As a tax on wealth, the property tax will fail to fall equally on
persons of equal wealth unless property is assessed according to its
value. If assessments are unequal, the tax stops being ad valorem, and
the tax stops being "just."'" As a surrogate tax on income or con-
sumption, horizontal equity is also lost when assessments are not
based on accurate appraisals of fair market value because a distortion
of value leads to a distortion of income or of consumption. No matter
what the economic basis of the property tax, assessing some property
at its fair market value while assessing similar property at less than
192. This was a recurring argument made by the respondents and their amici in
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992). See Brief of Respondents at 17-21, Nordlinger
(No. 90-1912); Brief of the United Justice Foundation and James V. Lacy as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 11-14, Nordlinger (No. 90-1912), Brief of the Washington Legal
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11, Nordlinger (No.
90-1912). Another related economic argument offered in defense of the acquisition cost as-
sessment scheme is the contention that it drives down the prices of homes so that the seller
ultimately bears some of the burden imposed by Proposition 13. Brief of Respondents at 25-
26, Nordlinger (No. 90-1912). This argument overlooks the fact that Proposition 13 probably
boosts prices by reducing the number of homes on the market. Moreover, any assumed re-
duction in prices brought about by Proposition 13 would not be shared by sellers on the
basis of the difference between assessed value and fair market value. Thus, sellers who bene-
fitted most from Proposition 13 would not suffer any more a reduction in selling price than
short-term owners who sell their homes. For more on this last point. see Reply Brief of
Petitioner at 15-16 n.10, Nordlinger (No. 90-1912).
193. "The market value or selling price of a dwelling depends on the net value of the
services generated by the dwelling. The principal benefit of home ownership is that it allows
the household to avoid paying rent." Sexton et al., supra note 39, at 94.
194. See ANALYZING ASSESSMENT EQurrY, supra note 180, at 103 (comment by Henry J.
Aaron).
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its fair market value will render the tax horizontally inequitable. 95
This is precisely what Proposition 13 did; it eliminated horizontal
equity, in its traditional sense, as an organizing principle of the prop-
erty tax.
In saying that Proposition 13 eliminates horizontal equity from
the property tax system, I am aware that one could argue that Propo-
sition 13 simply creates a new form of horizontal equity. One could
argue that Proposition 13's objective measure of equality is the date
of acquisition value.'96 In other words, two properties acquired on
the same date are treated in the same fashion since presumably both
properties were purchased for their fair market values. However, this
measure of horizontal equity is inadequate to satisfy most reasonable
conceptions of fairness because it is inherently arbitrary. The property
classes it establishes are too narrow because acquisition cost is a
number that declines in meaning over time. Thus, two properties of
equal value on their dates of acquisition may vary greatly in value on
the date of taxation. Two properties of vastly different acquisition
cost may be of equal value on the date of taxation. What sense does
it make to use these historical numbers to tax current wealth, income,
or consumption? It makes no sense from an economic equality per-
spective.
With the passage of time the connection between the original
acquisition cost of property and its current fair market value disinte-
grates. This is so because the value of property is affected by many
factors. Those factors include demographic changes in the surrounding
neighborhood, the rate of inflation, the strength of the local economy,
the amount of money and effort the owner has expended to maintain
the property, and so on. The acquisition cost of a particular piece of
property may be no more indicative of its current value than a num-
195. This vulnerability of the property tax to manipulation by under or over assessment
is addressed by the constitutions of nearly all states through provisions requiring that all
property be assessed equally according to its just value. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2.1;
see also Glennon. supra note 51, at 264 n.8 (1990) (citing thirty-nine state constitutional
provisions mandating equal and uniform taxation and taxation according to value). Indeed,
California has such a provision in its constitution. But Proposition 13 twisted the meaning of
that provision by redefining "just value" to mean acquisition cost rather than fair market
value. See supra note 29.
196. In a sense this argument derives from the more fundamental argument that the term
"equality" is devoid of substantive meaning. For a significant defense of this idea see Peter
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982). For responses, see
Chemerinsky, supra note 167; Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983).
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ber drawn from a hat except that it is likely to be lower than current
value. A property tax assessment system based on acquisition cost,
thus, tends to randomize the tax burden borne by property owners,
but in a manner that favors long-term owners over short-term owners.
Since the tax burden one bears has no rational connection to an
equalizing base, the tax becomes an arbitrary mechanism for extract-
ing revenue from the populace. Such a tax lacks normative legitimacy
because it has no claim to being fair. Thus, we must reject the argu-
ment that Proposition 13 creates a new form of horizontal equity.'97
Instead, we must recognize that the acquisition-cost assessment
scheme rejects horizontal equity as an organizing principle of the
property tax. If horizontal equity is the single most important value of
modem taxation, can its elimination be rational? I think not. One way
to demonstrate this is to translate the acquisition-cost assessment
scheme into similar principles of income and consumption taxation as
is done in part V of this Article.
D. Horizontal Equity as Moral Truth
In our society a rational property tax must be founded on fair-
ness. I believe that this principle holds true for any tax that reaches a
significant portion of the population. The reasons supporting this
principle are simple and, mostly, obvious. Our ideal conception of
ourselves and of our society is that of a nation of free women and
men living together in equality. Of course, we recognize that our
ideal is not always mirrored in actual circumstances. But we write our
laws and enforce them with the goal of equality before us. We may
disagree on what precisely is meant by "equality," but we do not
disagree that it is a proper goal and standard. When our taxing sys-
tem rejects the standard of equality, the public is encouraged to view
the tax system as a jumble of rules to be manipulated rather than as
a rational tool for maintaining the government. When the government
is seen as not being evenhanded in its levies, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to justify a demand that the citizenry should gracefully
accede to the government's need for revenue. "[We cannot wisely or
reasonably promote enterprise, thrift, or industry by tax measures
197. In its amicus brief, the International Order of Assessing Officers noted that, based
on the 1980 census, just three years after the enactment of Proposition 13, California had
gone from sixth to thirty-third among the states in assessment uniformity. See Brief of Inter-
national Order of Assessing Officers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12,
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (No. 90-1912).
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which systematically repudiate justice among persons. ''98
There is an inescapably moralistic aspect to this argument. The
principle of horizontal equity may be seen as an attempt to state an
objective moral truth.' Whether objective moral truth exists is, of
course, subject to debate.2" If it does, the principle that like cases
should be treated alike seems an appropriate candidate for such status.
After all, treating like cases alike is an implicit element in our con-
ception of the rule of law. It is an aspect of the categorical impera-
tive.01 It is a variation of the Golden Rule.2°2 Even if there are no
objective moral truths in an absolute sense, the nearly universal ac-
ceptance of the principle of treating like cases alike should weigh
heavily with anyone attempting to design a taxation scheme. The
superiority of the principle of treating like cases alike does not de-
pend upon proof that it is an objective truth existing like a law of
nature, outside of human control. Instead, its superiority is established
by our belief in it. As a community we have accepted the principle,
and by our belief, we have made it true.
Failure to conform our taxing scheme to this principle calls into
question either the principle or the taxing scheme. In considering
whether we want to call into question the principle of taxing equals
equally, we must consider where disavowal of the principle leads.
One possible, even likely, outcome is that we could end up with a
taxing scheme that legitimizes what have been called "naked prefer-
ences."2 3 "When a naked preference is at work, one group or per-
198. SIMONS, supra note 167, at 11 (specifically defending the principle of horizontal
equity).
199. Economists in particular have often addressed the principles of horizontal equity and
vertical equity as representations of objective truth. See Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity:
Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989); Musgrave, supra note 171,
at 114-17.
200. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424
(1992); Jeremy Waldron, On the Objectivity of Morals: Thoughts on Gilbert's Democratic
Individuality, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1361 (1992) (book review).
201. "There is . . . only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only according to that
maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (Lewis W. Beck
trans., 1959) (1785).
202. The Golden Rule is commonly stated as: "Do as you would be done by." Or, con-
versely, as: "what you do not want [done to] yourself, don't inflict on another." CONFUCIUS,
CONFUCIAN ANALECTS bk. 15. § 23 (Ezra Pound trans., Peter Owen Ltd. 1956). It has also
been stated by Aristotle as: we should behave to our friends "[als we should wish them to
behave -to us," DIOGENES LAERTIUS. LivEs OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS bk. V, § 21 (R.D.
Hicks trans.. Harvard University Press 1950), and in the Bible as: "Therefore whatever you
want others to do for you, do so for them." Matthew 7:12.
203. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
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son is treated differently from another solely because of a raw exer-
cise of political power; no broader or more general justification ex-
ists."2" I believe that Proposition 13 is an example of naked prefer-
ences at work. If there are any readers who are in doubt about this,
perhaps placing the acquisition cost rule of Proposition 13 into other
taxing schemes will make this point more believable.
V. TRANSLATING PROPOSITION 13 INTO COMPARABLE PRINCIPLES
OF INCOME TAXATION AND CONSUMPTION TAXATION
A. Translating Proposition 13 into an Income Tax
Imagine an income tax where one's taxable income was deter-
mined by reference to one's income in the year that one acquired a
given job. We might call this an acquisition-income system. As long
as the taxpayer was employed by the same employer, her taxable
income could not increase even if the taxpayer's actual income in-
creased. Thus, for example, if Jill, a longtime executive for a large
corporation, began her career by earning twenty-five thousand dollars
annually and ten years later was earning seventy-five thousand dol-
lars, she would pay the same amount of income taxes in each of the
ten years of her employment. Suppose Jill had a next door neighbor,
Jack, who had just moved to town and who started a new job earning
seventy-five thousand dollars annually. While Jill was earning seven-
ty-five thousand dollars and paying income taxes computed on a
salary of twenty-five thousand dollars, Jack would be earning seventy-
five thousand and paying income taxes computed on a salary of sev-
enty-five thousand dollars. Thus, even if the system employed a flat
or proportionate rate income tax, Jack would pay three times as much
tax as Jill. Is this difference in treatment between Jill and Jack ratio-
nal?205
1689, 1689 (1984).
204. Id. at 1693.
205. I recognize that my basic analogy might be imperfect. In particular, one might con-
tend that Jill is less deserving of protection than the long-term owner of California property
because she has the cash to pay higher taxes. But, it is important to remember that the mere
fact that one's home was worth much less when one bought it than it does currently cannot
establish that one lacks the cash to pay property taxes derived from a fair market value
assessment. Indeed, there is evidence that there is a correlation between market value and
ability to pay. See supra part II.A. If the acquisition-cost assessment scheme is a valid mea-
sure of ability to pay, why does Proposition 13 use fair market value as the assessment base
when value declines below acquisition-cost? See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(b); State Bd. of
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If we were members of the present Supreme Court, we might
argue in support of the acquisition-income system ithat it fosters sta-
bility in employment by penalizing those persons who change jobs.
The size of the penalty would certainly be significant enough to deter
many job changes. Suppose, for example, the tax rate was a flat
thirty percent. Jill would pay $7,500 in taxes under the acquisition-
income scheme."a In order for Jill to change jobs with any signifi-
cant increase in her after tax income, Jill's new job would have to
pay roughly one hundred thousand dollars annually. 7 In short, she
has to increase her salary by almost twenty-five thousand dollars just
to break even because of the tax increase she will suffer if she
changes jobs. Unless Jill is an extraordinary individual it seems un-
likely that she will find many employers willing to hire her away
from her present employer with a salary offer that she will find entic-
ing. It seems quite reasonable to assume that the acquisition-income
scheme will rationally further the goal of fostering stable employment
by discouraging people, such as Jill, from changing jobs.
Does Jill's new neighbor, Jack, have just cause for complaint
because of Jill's lower income tax bill? The present Supreme Court
might answer that he does not. After all, Jack knew what he was
getting into when he accepted his new job. The Court might state that
Jill pays less taxes than Jack because she is different from him. This
difference is that Jack has chosen to go against the governmental
policy of maintaining stability in employment. Of course, from Jack's
narrow perspective the acquisition income scheme is patently unfair
since he pays three times as much in taxes as Jill, despite the fact
that she earns just as much as him. Because of their disparate tax
treatment, Jack's after tax income is fifteen thousand dollars less than
Jill's.2" Of course, the Court might state that the difference arises
from Jack's exercise of his free choice to place himself in a different
class from Jill.
The Court might also point out that there is a silver lining to
Equalization v. Board of Supervisors, 164 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Ct. App. 1980).
206. In order to calculate Jill's taxes under the acquisition-income scheme, multiply Jill's
initial salary level by the thirty percent flat tax: $25,000 x .30 = $7,500.
207. Jill's present after tax income is $67,500 ($75,000 - $7,500 = $67,500). If her sala-
ry were $100,000 in a new job, her after tax income would be $70,000 ($100,000 x .30 =
$30,000; $100,000 - $30,000 = $70,000). Thus, Jill would only have a net gain of $2,500 as
a result of a $25,000 increase in her salary.
208. Jack pays $22,500 in income tax ($75,000 x .30 = $22,500) while Jill pays only
$7,500 in income tax on the same amount of income. Thus, the difference in taxes paid by
Jack and Jill is $15,000 ($22,500 - $7,500 = $15,000).
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Jack's dark cloud. If he stays with his job through a series of raises,
his effective tax rate will decline because of the acquisition-income
system. Thus, over time Jack will be relatively advantaged over other
taxpayers whose earnings equal his but, whose present income is
closer to their acquisition-income than his. If Jill's income growth
keeps pace with Jack's, she will always have a significant tax advan-
tage over him. But, in time, Jack may have a similar advantage over
other taxpayers.
In order to continue the parallel with the acquisition-cost assess-
ment scheme adopted by Proposition 13, it would be necessary to add
a corollary principle to the acquisition-income tax. A provision would
need to be made for the child of an employee to succeed to her
parent's acquisition-income base in the event the child took over the
parent's job. Obviously, this rule would favor persons owning their
own businesses since they have greater control than most people over
who will succeed them. But, nominally, anyone who succeeds to their
parents' employment could take advantage of this tax break. Such a
rule seems highly conducive to maintaining strong family ties between
parents and children. A government policy which rationally furthers
the goal of stronger families should be able to withstand equal protec-
tion challenge, should it not?
B. Translating Proposition 13 into a Consumption Tax
Imagine a taxing scheme where taxpayers paid sales taxes on
specific goods based on the prices in effect when they first purchased
that particular item. As long as a taxpayer remained loyal to a partic-
ular brand, her sale taxes on purchases of that item could not increase
even though the prices for that item might go up. Thus, if a taxpayer
bought her first car, a Ford, for ten thousand dollars, the sales tax on
all future Ford purchases by that taxpayer would be computed on a
sale price of ten thousand dollars. We might call this an acquisition-
cost sales tax.
Suppose under this system of taxation, Jack was a longtime
buyer of Oldsmobiles. Suppose Jack's first Oldsmobile cost him five
thousand dollars. Suppose further, that in the current year Jill, who
had never owned an Oldsmobile, and Jack both buy new Oldsmobiles
costing twenty-five thousand dollars each. Under an acquisition-cost
sales tax, Jack will pay sales tax computed on a five thousand dollar
purchase price, and Jill will pay sales tax computed on a twenty-five
thousand dollar purchase price. Thus, Jill will pay five times as much
sales tax on her purchase as Jack paid on his purchase. Is this dispa-
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rate treatment violative of the Equal Protection Clause?
The majority of the present Supreme Court might justify the
acquisition-cost sales tax as a rational, if indirect, means of protecting
jobs. Since people who change brands will be penalized as compared
to those people who remain loyal to the same brands,"° taxpayers
have an economic incentive to stay loyal. This loyalty should serve to
insulate established domestic businesses from market erosion by for-
eign competitors. This, in turn, should protect the jobs of those peo-
ple employed by the established domestic employers. The Court might
also point out that Jill has chosen to place herself in a different class
from Jack by changing automobile brands. Thus, if she pays more tax
than Jack, it is because she has made a deliberate choice to pay more
tax.
As in the case of the acquisition-cost income tax, a final bit of
gloss is needed here to fully maintain the parallel with Proposition
13. That is, a taxpayer's children would be entitled to take the
taxpayer's sales tax base as their own if they remained loyal to the
brand choices of their parents. Assume that Bob bought his first
Oldsmobile for five thousand dollars. If Bob's daughter also buys
Oldsmobiles, she would acquire Bob's five thousand dollar sales tax
base for her automobile purchases. This brand loyalty passed down
from parent to child will obviously work to preserve the market share
of existing businesses, and thereby preserve the jobs of the workers
employed by those businesses. From that perspective, the acquisition-
cost sales tax is rational, is it not?
VI. A MESSAGE TO THE COURT AND TO
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS
It appears that at least some (and perhaps most) respected consti-
tutional scholars agree with the outcome in Nordinger,1 ° and in-
deed, are likely to applaud it.2 ' This recognition cannot help but
give a disagreeing but prudent person pause to ponder. Perhaps I am
mistaken in thinking that Nordlinger is a bad decision. Perhaps tax
theory has no place in constitutional discourse, even when that dis-
course is deciding the fate of one of our tax systems. Yet, I await
209. I am assuming that prices for most commodities will rise over time.
210. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
211. Professors Cohen, Ely, and Glennon all seem to be in this camp (although Glennon
and Ely are less explicit than Cohen). See Cohen, A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh, supra




I have argued that whether we regard the property tax as a tax
on wealth, income, or consumption it still depends on the use of fair
market value assessments to maintain horizontal equity."' The con-
stitutional scholar might reply that the people of California have exer-
cised their sovereign right to create a new tax based on acquisition-
cost rather than wealth, income, or consumption. Are they not free to
create a new tax? My response is that the rejection of horizontal
equity is not rational in a society that has deliberately adopted equali-
ty as a chief normative value. "But what is equality?" the constitu-
tional scholar might ask. "Is not the facial neutrality of an acquisi-
tion-cost assessment scheme a form of equality?" My reply is two-
fold. First, the apparent neutrality of Proposition 13 actually institu-
tionalizes the advantages of wealth and property. In this sense it is
not neutral at all. Second, in matters of taxation, equality is treating
like economic cases alike.
This second assertion may be seen as begging the question be-
cause there are a variety of criteria that might be employed to estab-
lish economic likeness. Proposition 13 uses acquisition value as the
criteria for determining likeness. Is that criteria so inferior to wealth,
income, or consumption? My answer is yes because, over time, acqui-
sition value is dramatically more arbitrary as a measure of tax liabili-
ty. It has no economic claim to normative fairness. Over time it has
little or no rational connection with the taxpayer's ability to pay. It is
a number that with each passing year is less and less rationally relat-
ed to the tax liabilities of persons situated in similar economic cir-
cumstances. In short, if we want our property tax system to be fair, it
is irrational to choose an acquisition-cost assessment base.
I am certain there are a great many people who see the property
tax as just an irritating jumble of rules. Seen from the outside, most
tax schemes look this way. To such persons, Proposition 13 may
appear as a mere technical change in the property tax. Along similar
lines, some might say that the property tax is such a bad tax that one
more bad rule grafted on to it should not rise to the level of a consti-
tutional error.2"3 Seeing the failure of these arguments lies in seeing
212, 1 do not contend that fair market value is the only rational tax base one could
adopt for the property tax. I believe that fair rental value, for example, would be a thorough-
ly rational basis for assessment of real property. Any standard that embraces a reasonable
degree of horizontal equity may be a rational base.
213. This was a recurring argument of the respondents and their amici in Nordlinger.
See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 9-12, Nordlinger (No. 90-1912); Brief of the State of Cali-
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that whatever rationality the property tax may enjoy is embodied in
the principle of equalized assessments. This is because the rational
justification of any tax has a moral aspect. The principle of taxing
economic equals equally is the moral justification for the lroperty tax.
Take away this principle and the property tax is rendered a tax with-
out any moral sense. It becomes the tax that fell from the sky. This
is true without regard to whether we conceive of the property tax as
a tax on wealth, as a tax on income, or as a tax on consumption. In
all three cases our reason for choosing to have a property tax causes
us to establish tax liabilities by reference to current value. This is
because fair market value is our direct measuring rod for wealth, and
serves as an indirect measure of income or of consumption. The fair
market value assessment system permits us to treat economic equals
equally by giving us a rational and objective basis for measuring
equality.
The acquisition-cost system, in contrast, renders the tax an arbi-
trary event in which equally situated taxpayers are treated unequally.
This tax says to taxpayers "You pay X dollars and you pay Y dol-
lars. Don't ask why. There is no why. There is only the rule that you
pay X dollars and you pay Y dollars." Such a system has no basis
for commanding our respect except by the exercise of raw power.
Those persons lucky enough to pay relatively low taxes under such a
system may be inclined to accept it. But they will do so with a wink
or a sneer. Those persons compelled to pay a disproportionately large
share of the overall tax burden will see themselves as oppressed.
Perhaps if such a system were entirely random, we could somehow
accept it. But when this arbitrary system is rigged to primarily benefit
established wealth, the additional unfairness makes it intolerable.
Proposition 13 robbed the property tax of its moral foundation.
One does not need to be a tax expert or even a lawyer to see that
much. This being so, how do we explain the Court's indifference to
the moral vacuum left by Proposition 13? Perhaps the Court is offer-
ing a crude reflection of the antifoundationalist themes of modem
legal scholarship. If so, it is a perverse view of those theories. The
anti-foundationalists have told us that there are no objective moral
fornia as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 17, Nordlinger (No. 90-1912). In




truths that transcend our own social conditions.2"4 According to this
view our moral beliefs merely reflect who we are and the society that
formed us. Thus, one under the sway of this philosophy might reason
that no person's view of fairness is entitled to more weight than
another's. All morality becomes relative. In the case before us the
Court might reason that the majority of California homeowners are
entitled to have their view of property tax fairness take precedence
over the Court's own view because neither view has any transcendent
claim to rightness. The error in this approach, however, is in taking
the antifoundationalist notion of ungrounded morality as a means to
escape responsibility rather than as a statement of the truth that we
are all responsible. Whatever the source of our beliefs, we cannot
escape the act of judgment because even our omissions and our with-
holdings of judgment are in themselves judgments with moral dimen-
sions and human consequences." 5
When we defer to the moral judgments of others we may be
exercising moral tolerance or moral cowardice. Recognizing the differ-
ence is a matter for profound introspection. It is also a matter where
it is important to understand that there is a humanistic objectivity still
available to aid us in our moral deliberations. This objectivity is
found in the distilled wisdom of our greatest philosophers, judges,
scholars, teachers, and leaders. It is found in the commonalities cours-
ing through our sense of what is fair and just. This humanistic objec-
tivity, though contextual, secular and ungrounded, still commands our
respect because it offers ideals that have stood the test of time. Thus,
one may justifiably argue that even in a world where absolute moral
objectivity is thought impossible, a court confronted with a palpable
injustice which it is empowered to correct that does nothing has en-
gaged in an act of moral cowardice.
Whatever its motivation in Nordlinger, it is my conviction that
the Supreme Court failed California and it failed the country when it
upheld the acquisition-cost property tax assessment system as rational-
214. As Thomas Morawetz writes:
A pervasive theme of recent legal theory is profound skepticism about the
possibility of consensus in social values and goals. Accompanying such skepticism
is multifaceted doubt about objectivity, rationality, and the possibility of social
progress. Skeptical theorists reject the idea of shared intellectual foundations and
therefore are generally called antifoundationalists.
Morawetz, supra note 99, at 374 (citation omitted).
215. See Martha Nussbaum, "Only Grey Matter"? Richard Posner's Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Sex, 59 U. Ci. L. REv. 1689. 1708-09 (1992). There are various other attacks on moral
relativism that I do not raise here. See Waldron, supra note 200, at 1371-81.
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ly based. However, it may well have the chance to reconsider its
position since the case may come before it again. The right to travel
issue that the Court declined to decide in Nordlinger could yet serve
as the basis for overturning Proposition 13.2"6 But with its decision
in Nordlinger, the Court has backed itself into a comer. Whether it
will be willing to reconsider its position in Nordlinger and take a
different approach remains to be seen.
VII. CONCLUSION
A clear goal of the acquisition-cost assessment scheme was to
shift the property tax burden from one group, most of whom had the
opportunity to vote for Proposition 13, to another group, many of
whom had no vote, on the arbitrary basis of "I was here first." This
is the sort of exercise of naked preference that the Equal Protection
Clause was enacted to prevent."1 7 In saying this, I recognize that
even a tax system that is sound in its fundamental principles will
produce some unfairness in practice. This has always been true of the
property tax. However, a tax system that is corrupt in its basic theory
assures pervasive unfairness. This is a significant difference. Proposi-
tion 13's absolute disregard for horizontal equity assures a pervasive
unfairness that is not balanced by any unique merits. It has two os-
tensible virtues; it provides certainty, and it freezes the tax liabilities
of homeowners on modest fixed incomes. But neither of those virtues
depends upon the law's discriminatory aspect. Those goals could
largely have been achieved by enactment of a compensating tax rate
that declined as assessments increased. In short, both of its supposed
virtues are achievable without abandoning horizontal equity. Thus, to
give up horizontal equity to achieve them is not rational. Indeed it is
quite irrational since horizontal equity is a fundamental principle of
just taxation. In our society a rational tax is not unjust."8
216. Some commentators see a further challenge to Proposition 13 as fairly likely. See,
e.g., Carol Douglas, Panels Consider Future of California's Proposition 13, 57 TAX NOTES
309 (1992).
217. See Sunstein, supra note 203, at 1692, 1697, 1710-14.
218. Of course, one can argue that a rational taxing scheme need not be fair. But is
there really anyone who holds this point of view? I doubt it. I doubt that anyone, including
Justice Blackmun, really believes that a pervasively unfair tax system is rational. Deliberative
discourse with such people, if they exist, concerning the proper form for a property tax may
be useless. That is, if we cannot agree that fairness should be central to any rational taxing
scheme, we may be too far apart to communicate in a meaningful fashion. Probably nothing
in this Article could reach the person who believes that a tax need not be fair in order to be
rational. The person at whom this Article is directed is one who accepts fairness as an im-
1993]
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Whether Proposition 13 is simply an aberration or whether it
represents the wave of the future in property taxation remains to be
seen. In part, the answer will turn on whether the voting public con-
tinues to have a moral commitment to the concept of equal taxation
embodied in the fair market value assessment. But the recent enact-
ment of a law resembling Proposition 13 by referendum in Florida
does not bode well." 9 It is a simple fact that established homeown-
ers (who also compose a large portion of currently registered voters)
have a clear economic incentive to favor the acquisition-cost assess-
ment scheme. By freezing their own assessments while allowing com-
parably housed latecomers (who may not be current voters in the
state) to be assessed at higher values, voters can reduce their own
future tax liabilities while also continuing to receive government
services that a revenue freeze might make unaffordable. In short, they
can minimize their taxes while passing on the costs of government to
others. It is not pretty. It is not fair. But it is appealing in a base sort
of way. Do the voters possess the "public virtue" to withstand the
temptation?"2 Perhaps not. It is easy to rationalize that the latecom-
plicit element of a rational property tax, but who also believes that fairness has an indefinite
meaning in the context of the property tax. I have attempted to persuade that person that
fairness is not an utterly indeterminate concept in the property tax context.
219. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(c); see William D. Townsend, Voters Impose Property
Tax Limit for Homeowners, 92 ST. TAX NoTEs 262 (1992). According to the State's Attorney
General this provision went into effect in Florida on January 5, 1993. 1992 FLA. ATr'Y GEN.
ANN. REP. 92-90.
220. The question is of longstanding duration. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Theme
of Early American Law Teaching: The Political Ethics of Francis Lieber, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC.
339, 352-53 (1992). "An important weakness of republican government widely perceived by
American Revolutionaries was the difficulty of inculcating and maintaining the transfer of
loyalty to community or nation implied by classical notions of public virtue." Id. at 352.
Professor Carrington offers a fascinating description of a solution proposed by many eminent
persons of the post-revolutionary period to the problem of maintaining a government that was
both just and republican. That solution was a system of moral education for the nation's
future leaders, i.e., for its lawyers.
George Wythe [the nation's first law professor] and his followers were consciously
engaged in moral education: they sought to prepare young men (and, at Oberlin,
perhaps a woman or two) for public life in a democracy. They taught law as an
act of patriotism. What they sought was to inculcate standards of public conduct
appropriate to popular self-government subject to constitutional constraints.
Id. at 340. One cannot help but note that a law teacher who pursued such a course of in-
struction today would likely be charged with preaching political correctness. However, this
approach to law teaching continues to have some adherents. See, e.g., Michael L Swygert,
Striving to Make Great Lawyers-Citizenship and Moral Responsibility: A Jurisprudence for
Law Teaching, 30 B.C. L. REv. 803 (1989). But cf. Lee Modjeska, On Teaching Morality to
Law Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71 (1991). For a reply to Professor Modjeska see Peter F.
Lake, Make Lawyers, Not Lethal Sheep, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 271 (1992).
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ers know what they are getting into. Can we really expect the voters
to care about the latecomers who can never buy a home because of
the disproportionate tax burden they are being asked to bear? How
will the electorate react to the likelihood that the latecomers are
drawn disproportionately from among racial minorities, from among
the young, and from the upwardly mobile poor? Time will tell.
Some readers might consider my discontent with the Court's
decision in Nordlinger as merely a reflection of postmodern angst."2
However, I would suggest that it is the Supreme Court that has been
infected by a perverse form of postmodernism. By failing to confront
the values inherent in taxation, its judgment has foundered under the
weight of a moral relativism which argues that no person's sense of
rightness is entitled to more weight than any other person's. Once
shorn of a sense of objective principle, changes in a taxing scheme
take on the appearance of mere rule changes without moral dimen-
sion. One can argue that "our ideals of justice in taxation change
with the alteration in social conditions."' But the principle that
equals should be taxed equally has an immediate and visceral appeal
that should make us reluctant to pronounce it a mere passing fancy. It
is a principle that underlies all of our current forms of taxation. Its
abandonment represents a more radical change in "our ideals of jus-
tice" than any other change in taxation we have witnessed in this
century.'
221. See J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1966,
1967 (1992) "Postmodern legal culture is the rout of progressive forces, the increasing insu-
larity, self-absorption, and fragmentation of progressive academic writing, and the increasing
irrelevance of that writing to the positive law of the U.S. Constitution." Id. at 1967. Else-
where in the same piece, Professor Balkin writes, "[wle thus witness the creation of a 'shad-
ow constitution' by progressive scholars, in which they declaim what the Constitution really
means in the face of the increasing likelihood that it will never mean that in practice." Id. at
1986. Although I find other aspects of Professor Balkin's essay quite engaging (though not
relevant here), I believe his implicit criticism of "progressive scholars" is short-sighted. Histo-
ry is not like a baseball game with a beginning and an end. Who is to say whether the
"shadow constitution" of today will not be the "living constitution" a century from now. I
should add that perhaps I am reading a more critical edge into Professor Balkin's words than
was intended. In the end his own conclusion is that "Knowledge is Material." Id. at 1990.
Such a view seems to transcend a requirement of immediate relevance.
222. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 1. "Not only the actual forms of taxation, but the theo-
ries of taxation as well, vary with the economic basis of society . . . .Like all the facts of
social life, taxation itself is only an historical category." Id.
223. I recognize this is a rather sweeping generalization. In this century, we have seen
the enactment of both the income tax and the social security tax. We have also seen the
widespread growth of broad based sales taxation. The reason I consider this change more
fundamental than those is that the income tax, the sales tax, and the social security tax all
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In Nordlinger, the Court has rationalized a readily observable
injustice. It has sanctified a form of institutionalized oppression of
one group by another group on grounds that reflect a mistaken un-
concern for tax theory and a misguidedly muted conscience. The
present Supreme Court has chosen to stunt its own powers of percep-
tion and reason in the name of judicial deference. It has shown itself
willing to countenance flagrant inequality in the name of non-intru-
siveness. This approach is problematic in areas such as taxation where
the established majority may have a clear economic incentive to dis-
criminate against latecomers. The political process does not always
work in the defense of minority interests, especially those minorities
that will have only a future existence. Traditionally, defense of minor-
ity rights to equal treatment has been the role of the judiciary. 4 By
abandoning this role in Nordlinger, the Supreme Court has created a
void in the legal framework of our society. With no one to fill the
role of fair arbiter in matters of discriminatory taxation schemes, the
states are left to sink or swim upon a stormy sea ruled by passion,
prejudice, and self-interest.
embrace the principle of horizontal equity. In that sense they are continuations of orthodox
tax theory. As I have tried to show, the acquisition-cost assessment scheme is a radical de-
parture from orthodox tax theory.
224. See Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162,
1164-65 (1977). In fairness, one should note that Professor Sandalow was skeptical of the
virtues of this tradition. See id at 1172-75. But it did receive his qualified endorsement. Id.
at 1183-90 (arguing for a historical/process oriented system of judicial review).
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